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SOVIET UNION MILITARY-ECONOMIC REPORT

Translated from the German Report

Dated: 2 February 1945

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Military-Economic Report

(Based on domestic radio traffic)

2 February 1945

FOREWORD

This report summarizes military-economic information for the following periods:

For the fourth quarter of 1944:

- 1) Personnel situation
- 2) Agriculture and food situation
- 3) Metal supply
- 4) Coal supply

For the second half of 1944:

- 5) Oil Supply
- 6) Auxiliary shipments from the Western Powers to the Soviet Union via Iran

In addition, a new chapter has been added covering the period from 1 November through 31 December on

- 7) Bolshevization of Estonia.

At this point it should again be emphasized that this report is based entirely on information intercepted from Soviet internal communications and therefore makes no claim to completeness. It presents a cross section of the economy of the Soviet Union. The statistics presented are not to be considered an absolute maximum, but rather as an indication of economic development.

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1. Personnel Situation

(1) The last quarter of 1944 produced no important changes in the overall personnel situation.

A. Resettlement Operations

(2) Resettlement of border populations from the "liberated territories" observed in the first, second and third quarters was noted continuing. For example, on 28 November the following message was intercepted:

From Minsk to Rostov/Don, to the Chairman of the Oblast' Executive Committee:

"In connection with the resettlement in White Russia of White Russians, Great Russians and Ukrainians from Polish territory, 70 Great Russian farmers have expressed the wish to be allowed to remain permanently in their present location. I request your permission.

(Signed) Kiseya (?),

Representative of the Chairman
of the White Russian Council."

(3) Refugees were expected in the Caucasus also. According to a message from the Georgian Council of Peoples' Commissars to the NK for Procurement in Moscow, the arrival of 1,000 refugee families was announced for December and January.

(4) Many plants and organizations had sent representatives or authorized agents into the White Russian and Ukrainian border areas to recruit volunteers. For example, at the end of October 80 workers were recruited from the village of Senkevichevka for the Thermal Combine in Rostov/Don.

(5) Recruitment and resettlement operations by representatives of the "liberated peoples" such as Poles, Rumanians, Finns, Estonians, Letts and Bulgarians could not be detected in internal radio traffic.

B. Conscription and Exemptions

(6) During the winter an easing of the manpower shortage was expected in comparison with the spring, summer and fall because large numbers of seasonal workers were thrown out of work in agriculture and the River Fleet. This was not the case, however, because the demands of the front grew on an increasing scale.

(7) Thus, according to messages from Baku (Transcaucasus), Rostov/Don (Donbas) and Barnaul (West Siberia), tractor and harvester combine operators in the class of 1927 were conscripted into the Army.

(8) Conscription had to be carried out also from branches of industry

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important to the war effort. For example, unemployed workers of the Oil Combine in Groznyj who were found fit for service at the front by the Medical Commission, were conscripted. At several industrial enterprises in Rostov/Don and Stalino exempted workers from the class of 1927 who had reported voluntarily to the Army were called up. In both cases the respective employers entered protests.

(9) Some exemptions were also noted. Thus, according to an order of 28 October from the NK for Defense, the following were exempted from military service: workers in the third and higher categories, including sailors, engine mechanics and assistants, stokers, machinists and assistants, crane operators and assistants, electrical engineers, divers, assemblers, riggers, ship machinists and lathe operators. According to a report in October, officers and engineers who had formerly been employed at a plant of the CD for Spare Parts in Erevan, were released from military service to resume employment at that plant.

C. Labor Conscription

(10) As in the previous year, the lack of housing, bed linen, special clothing and warm clothing was especially strongly felt during the winter. Some examples of this situation are as follows:-

(11) As of 20 September 6,000 persons were conscripted in Tbilisi for the NK for Coal. Included in this number were 4,555 persons who were transferred to Georgian coal enterprises. These enterprises were not able to make necessary preparations for the arrival of these workers and there were shortages of bed linen, special clothing and mine lamps. As a result of this, 530 workers illegally left their jobs. The Georgian Central Party Committee therefore had to consider partial dismissal of the labor conscriptees.

(12) For the Oil Industry 15,000 workers were conscripted, but they could not be employed because the necessary quarters and trade schools had not been prepared.

(13) In general, the labor conscriptions seemed to be progressing poorly. Thus, in Rostov/Don Oblast' the November-December conscription plan of 4,500 persons for the Combine Rostov-Ugol was fulfilled by the conscription of only 3,256 persons. Likewise, labor conscription for the Donbas Energostroj was not carried out. At a plant of the NK for Coal in Rostov/Don 3,000 conscriptees were released because they were not needed for production assignments.

(14) The NK for Iron in Moscow complained that, despite repeated demands, no workers had arrived at a plant in Gurevsk in Kemerovo Oblast'.

(15) In Stalingrad Oblast' the following workers were to be conscripted during the fourth quarter:

500	men	for	enterprises	of	the	NK	for	Armaments,
1,200	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	the Tank Industry, and
900	"	"	"	"	"	"	"	Construction.

However, as of 13 December these conscriptees had not yet been put to work.

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(16) According to a report from the Azerbajdzhan Labor Office, personnel requirements from the Azerbajdzhan Oil Combine could not be met.

D. Training Specialized Workers

(17) During the winter months especially strong emphasis was placed on the training of specialized workers. The following personnel were noted at technical and trade schools:

(18) Armenian Republic: (As of 10 Nov 44) Technical Schools

Total: 1,400 persons

Including: Youths from city areas	1,000
" " rural areas	400
	1,400;

Men	1,070
Women	330
	1,400;

From educational institutions of the NKVD	202
From schools of the NK for Education	122
Volunteers	164
Conscriptees	912
	1,400.

(19) Trainees were assigned to technical schools of individual Peoples' Commissariats as follows:

Technical schools of the NK for Nonferrous Metallurgy	350
" " " " " " the Timber Industry	150
" " " " " " Communications	150
" " " " " " Aircraft Construction	350
" " " " " " Light Machine "	200
" " " " " " Electric Power Stations	100
The Plant "Dzerzhinskij" of the NK for Machine Tool Construction	100
	1,400

(20) At the technical school of the Plant "Dzerzhinskij" insufficient living quarters and instruction space had been provided. The Armenian Labor Office allowed the plant until 1 December to alleviate these shortages. If these shortages could not be eliminated by that date, the above-mentioned 100 trainees were to be transferred to other technical schools.

(21) Trade Schools
Total: 190 persons (from cities)

Including: Men	106
Women	84
	190;

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From educational institutions of the NKVD	55
From schools of the NK for Education	100
Volunteers	25
Conscriptees	<u>10</u>
	190.

Further recruiting of technical trainees was in progress.

(22) Azerbaijdzhan SSR (As of 1 Nov 44) Technical Schools

Total: 2,621 persons

Including: Youths from cities	2,215
Youths from rural areas	<u>406</u>
	2,621;

Men	1,900
Women	<u>721</u>
	2,621;

Homeless persons	503
Students from higher educational institutions	34
Conscriptees	<u>2,084</u>
	2,621.

(23) Among others, trainees were assigned to technical schools of individual Peoples' Commissariats and enterprises as follows:

Azerbaijdzhan Oil Combine	250
NK for Communications	<u>200</u>
	450.

(24) Railroad and Trade Schools

Total: 925 persons

Including: Youths from cities	925;
-------------------------------	------

Men	576
Women	<u>349</u>
	925;

Homeless persons	276
Students from higher educational institutions	9
Conscriptees	<u>640</u>
	925.

Trainees were assigned to railroad and trade schools of individual Peoples' Commissariats as follows:

Azerbaijdzhan Oil Combine	625
NK for Communications	<u>300</u>
	925.

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(25) Ordzhonikidze Kraj (As of 25 Nov 44) Technical Schools

Total: 1,355 persons

Including: Youths from cities	200
Youths from rural areas	<u>1,155</u>
	1,355;

Men	684
Women	<u>671</u>
	1,355;

From educational institutions of the NKVD	57
From schools of the NK for Education	7
Volunteers	526
Conscriptees	<u>765</u>
	1,355.

Trainees were assigned to technical schools of individual Peoples' Commissariats as follows:

Technical school of the NK for Local Industry	114
" " " " " " Communications	659
Narkomkhoz	85
Technical school of the NK for Health	33
" " " " " " Civil Construction	332
" " " " " " the Timber Industry	<u>132</u>
	1,355.

(26) Trade Schools

Total: 746 persons

Including: Youths from cities	352
Youths from rural areas	<u>394</u>
	746;

Men	441
Women	<u>305</u>
	746;

From educational institutions of the NK for Education	33
Volunteers	583
Conscriptees	<u>128</u>
	746.

Trainees were assigned to tradeschools of individual Peoples' Commissariats as follows:

Trade school of the NK for Armaments	239
" " " " " " Agriculture	300

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Trade school of the NK for Communications	5
" " " " " " Health	96
" " " " " " Transportation	92
Workshops of the Labor Office	14
	746.

(27) A total of 2,101 persons including 1,111 volunteers was employed in technical and trade schools.

(28) Georgian SSR (As of 1 Nov 44) Technical Schools

Total: 500 persons

Including: Youths from cities	485
Youths from rural areas	15
	500;
Men	394
Women	106
	500;
Volunteers	78
From educational institutions of the NKVD	39
From schools of the NK for Education (?)	36
Conscriptees	347
	500;

Trainees were assigned to technical schools of individual Peoples' Commissariats as follows:

Technical schools of the NK for Transportation	181
" " " " " " the Aviation Industry	38
" " " " " " the Machine Tool Industry	126
" " " " " " Shipbuilding	39
" " " " " " ---	116
	500.

(29) Trade Schools

Total: 2,100 persons

Including: Volunteers	308
From educational institutions of the NKVD	60
Conscriptees	1,732
	2,100;

Trainees were assigned to technical schools of individual Peoples' Commissariats as follows:

Trade school of the NK for Transportation	650
" " " " " " ---	300
" " " " " " Coal	408
" " " " " " Shipbuilding	100
" " " " " " the Construction Industry	150

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Trade school of the NK for the Aviation Industry	392
" " " " " " ---	100
	2,100.

(30) Makhachkala Oblast'

According to a report from the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the Dagestan SSR on 16 Nov 44, technical schools had furnished 502 technical workers to industrial enterprises of the Republic during 1944. The recruiting plan was fulfilled with conscription of 1,178 persons. Of these, 692 were assigned to technical schools and 486 to trade schools.

(31) Rostov/Don Oblast'

As of 1 Nov 44 the conscription plans for technical schools (4,400 persons) and for trade schools (300 persons) had been fulfilled in the Oblast'. 4,500 persons were already in schools and 200 more were on the way. There were 24 technical schools and 20 trade schools in the Oblast'. Moreover, the opening of Technical School #13 of the NK for Housing and Civil Construction as well as of Trade School #13 of the NK for Electric Power Stations was imminent.

2. Agriculture and Food SituationI. Harvest Products, Harvest Deliveries, Grain Shipments and Conservation MeasuresA. Harvest Products

(32) Results of the 1944 harvest seemed to be generally satisfactory. Pronounced harvest failures were noted in only isolated cases. For example, according to a message in November certain rajons in the Georgian Republic suffered serious shortages of grain caused by poor harvest yields.

(33) The following harvest results were noted:

Rostov/Don Oblast'

A. Office of "Glavyuzhenergo" as of 10 November:

Total area harvested	1,130 hectares
Thrashed	580 "
Yield	6,316 dz*
Yield per hectare	11

The following were delivered to the Government:

917 dz Grain products	
1,082 Vegetables	
317 Potatoes	

* Abbreviation for "Doppelzentner", a measure of weight equal to 100 kilograms.

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Totals harvested:	110 hectares, 2,305 dz	Potatoes
	174	8,232 Vegetables
	30	2,440 Cabbage.

B. Auxiliary organizations of the Labor Office as of 1 October:

Fruit	33 dz
Vegetables	446
Products of the field	145
Millet	310
Sunflowers	14
Corn	23
	<u>971 dz.</u>

(34) Generally, unsatisfactory harvest of sunflowers and castor beans were noted in Rostov/Don Oblast'.

(35) According to a report 20 November, 60,000 hectares of sunflowers were not harvested in Rostov/Don Oblast' and the seed procurement plan for this important source of vegetable oil was only 28.9% fulfilled. The castor harvest was also below average, and many kolkhozes were forced to deliver sunflower seed instead of castor seed in a ratio of 2 dz of sunflower seeds to 1 dz castor seeds. The Office of the NK for Procurement had to secure special authorization to accept 4,000 tons of sunflower seeds with a moisture content of 20%. Authorization was granted on the condition that these seeds be immediately ground up because storage of this quantity of grain with such a high moisture content would be impossible.

(36) Above-plan deliveries were nevertheless noted in Rostov/Don Oblast', with a total of 1,483 extra tons of grain delivered from the sovkhoses of the Oblast'.

(37) Ordzhonikidze Kraj

As of 11 November the following were harvested:

Corn	59,000 hectares
Sunflowers	95,000
Castor	8,000
Potatoes	9,500.

(38) Dagestan Republic

In addition to their scheduled delivery obligations, the kolkhozes also fulfilled a voluntary delivery of 1,440 tons of bread grain for the Red Army.

(39) North Ossetia

Information on the condition of the corn harvest is given in the following message:

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"As a result of unfavorable summer and autumn weather in the mountain and forest sections of the Republic, the corn crop could not ripen and it has a high moisture content. Therefore, fulfillment of the grain procurement plan is extremely difficult. Permission is requested to deliver all the unripened corn, (to be used to produce alcohol providing it has a moisture content of 37%) directly to the alcohol factory, disregarding the quota of 1,000 tons of corn to be delivered to this factory."

(40) Azerbaijdzhan Republic

Kolkhozes of the Azerbaijdzhan SSR pledged themselves to furnish 8,000 tons of grain above plan for the grain stock of the Red Army.

B. Shortage of Storage Capacity

(41) The shortage of storage space for grain, castor seed and sunflower seed was also extremely serious during the period of this report. For example, only 20,000 extra tons of wheat could be accepted at the storehouses of the Armenian Grain Procurement Office in November. And even this acceptance was dependent on the shipment of 4,000 tons of beans and 1,000 tons of barley from the storehouses. The storehouses in Armavir were also filled to capacity with grain.

(42) During the winter construction of several grain silos and other storage buildings was noted. For example, the following were constructed:

Taganrog	2 Grain silos, total capacity 4,500 tons;
Uspenskaya	1 Grain silo, total capacity 2,000 tons;
Sinsyavskaya	1 Grain silo, total capacity 1,000 tons.

C. Grain Shipments

(43) One of the most pressing problems was the shipment of grain from internal regions to storage points at offices of the NK for Procurement and at railroad stations.

(44) In December the North Ossetian Party Committee received the following dispatch:

"The State Committee for Defense considers that next to complete fulfillment of the grain delivery plan the assignment most essential to the military and economic operation of the country is the shipment of the grain from internal regions to Grain Procurement Office collection points on railways and waterways. On the successful fulfillment of this obligation depends the smooth flow of bread to the Red Army as well as to the civilian population and industrial centers. There are 2,000 tons of grain to be shipped from internal regions by kolkhozes by 1 March 1945. The executive committees and governments of the republics have received authorization to enlist all available workers for the period of shipping grain from internal regions. Top priority is to be given to the shipment of

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unripened or wet grain and to shipment of grain which is stored under unsuitable conditions in order to avoid loss of these stocks.

"The NK for Sovkhozes is ordered to make use of both transportation facilities belonging to the sovkhozes and also the truck park belonging to "Sovkhoztrans" in order to transport by 1 March the grain stored in internal regions at sovkhozes of the North Ossetian ASSR. Transportation facilities furnished for grain transport are not to be diverted to other uses. Issuance of motor gasoline and tractor fuel to the NK for Procurement and to the NK for Sovkhozes for transport of grain from internal regions is to be given priority over issuance to all other consumers by order of the NK for Defense."

(45) The following results and plans for grain shipments have been noted to date:

Rostov/Don:

The following was to be transported by truck from military units:

Planned	144,320 tons	
Actual fulfillment	217,991	= 151%
Rostov Oblast', planned	94,490	
Actual fulfillment	126,665	= 134%
Krasnodar Kraj, planned	49,830	
Actual fulfillment	91,326	= 183%

(46) For the period of September through December transport of 320,000 tons of grain was planned. In September and October a total of 406,071 tons was carried out. On 25 November the amount of grain shipped in Rostov/Don Oblast' reached 505,252 tons. In the first 27 days of October 14,422 tons of grain were shipped by water on the Lower Don.

(47) The extent to which the railroads were used in grain shipments is indicated by the following message:

The Office of Grain Procurement South has large amounts of oats, millets and barley stored at Tarasovka, Glubokaya and Chebetovka. Because of insufficient railroad cars the grain cannot be transported. In October (?) shipments were as follows:

<u>Depot</u>	<u>Cars Planned</u>	<u>Actually Provided</u>
Tarasovka	128	6
Glubokaya	159	8
Chebetovka	126	20.

(48) An additional message in October confirms the difficult transportation conditions:

For October a shipment of 80,660 tons of grain to the Office

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of Grain Procurement South was planned for the Stalingrad Railroad. From 1 through 23 October only 33,787 tons were actually shipped. This left 46,873 tons not shipped, including the following stocks:

in Sal'sk	27,228 tons
Kotel'nikovo	1,304
Morosovskaya	6,586.

(49) In the first ten day period of November no cars were furnished. At the Railroad Station of Blagodarnoe in Rostov Oblast' also, shipments of grain were especially poor. Instead of 681 railroad cars, only 110 were provided. 15,000 tons of grain had to be stored in the open. According to a December report from the NK for Procurement in Moscow, 100,000 tons of wheat and rye had accumulated by 1 December at railroad and waterway collection points of the Grain Procurement Office. Because of a lack of railroad cars the grain could not be shipped.

(50) Kabardino-Balkar Republic

As of 20 November, grain shipments and deliveries were as follows:

<u>Planned</u>	<u>Fulfillment</u>	<u>Percentage Fulfillment</u>
64,388 tons	53,457 tons	83%.

(51) Azerbaijdzhan Republic

The Azerbaijdzhan Procurement and Transport Directorate had set up the following plan for shipments of grain in October:

	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Transport Performance</u>
Baku, depot with 5 trucks	2,000 tons	42,000 ton-km
Pushkino, " " 6 "	400	28,000
Evlakh, " " 8 "	600	40,000
Kirovabad, " " 8 "	?	34,000
Zakataly, " " 6 "	400	40,000
Nukha, " " 6 "	400	35,000
Khachmass, " " ? "	500	6,000

(52) According to a report from Eksportkhleb to the NK for Procurement in Moscow, on 25 November grain shipments from internal regions were completed. A total of 15,994 tons were shipped.

(53) Ordzhonikidze Kraj

In December 1944 grain shipments amounting to 27,000 tons were prescribed. Of this, 20,000 tons were to be carried by trucks belonging to Soyuzzagottrans and 7,000 tons by transportation facilities belonging to the sovkhoses.

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(54) Stalingrad Oblast'

Offices of the NK for Procurement were to make shipment of 103,050 tons of grain by 1 March 1945.

(55) Krasnodar Kraj and Ordzhonikidze Kraj

Wheat deliveries from Krasnodar and Ordzhonikidze Krai were not satisfactory. Instead of a shipment of 45,000 tons of grain in November, only 7,000 tons were delivered. The following were required in the entire Azerbajdzhan SSR:

20,000 tons of wheat (for civilian supplies)
10,000 tons of grain (above plan)
40,000 tons of seed grain.

D. Quantitative Distribution of Bread Grain Deliveries

(56) The table below shows the extent to which Rostov/Don and Krasnodar Oblasti and Ordzhonikidze Kraj acted as suppliers for other regions of the Soviet Union:

<u>Grain</u>	<u>Amount (tons)</u>	<u>Consignee</u>
<u>Rostov/Don - in September</u>		
Wheat	5,000	Pridacha, Voronezh Oblast'
Barley	9,000	Ryazan' Oblast'
<u>in October</u>		
Rye	250	Yaroslavl' Oblast'
Wheat	6	" "
Rye	1,347	Ivanovo "
"	2,304	Saratov "
Wheat	16	" "
Millet	1,178	" "
Barley	4,456	Kujbyshev "
Rye	132	" "
Barley	1,903	Tatar "
Hay	2,398	Penza "
Corn	569	Ivanovo "
Wheat	8,211	Gorkij "
Barley	8,565	Kujbyshev "
Wheat	50	" "
Rye	10	Ryazan' "
"	561	Tambov "
Wheat	7,751	" "
"	4,251	Gorkij "
Rye	16	" "
"	1,477	Saratov "
Flour	573	White Russia

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<u>Grain</u>	<u>Amount (tons)</u>	<u>Consignee</u>
Flour	827	Voroshilovgrad Oblast'
"	364	Bryansk "
Groats	113	Stalino "
"	150	Voroshilovgrad "
Sifted flour	2,000	" "
" "	2,000	White Russia
" "	2,000	Bryansk Oblast'
Barley groats	500	Crimea
" "	500	Stalino Oblast'
" "	200	Voroshilovgrad Oblast'
Milletts	2,000	Kursk "
"	3,000	Penza "
"	4,000	Saratov "
"	4,000	Ulyanovsk "

in November

Wheat	100,000)	(Office of Grain Procurement
Barley	45,000)	(South in Moscow
Hay	5,000)	(
Barley	20,000	Shipped by military transport
Hay	5,000	" " " "
Bread grain	20,000	" " " "

in December

Corn	5,750	---
------	-------	-----

Krasnodar Kraj

in September

Wheat	7,000	Povorino, Voronezh Oblast'
Barley	13,000	Balashov
Wheat	22,000	"

in October

Sifted flour	5,000	Stalino Oblast'
" "	2,000	Voroshilovgrad Oblast'
Milletts	2,000	Kujbyshev "

Ordzhonikidze Kraj

in September

Wheat	12,500	Tambov Oblast'
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E. Estimates and Fulfillment of Agricultural Plans

(57) The following information on estimates and partial fulfillment of agricultural plans for the year 1945 has been reported:

1. Kabardino-Balkar Republic (in 1000 hectares)

a. Kolkhozes

To be cultivated in summer	1,555
To be cultivated in winter	<u>650</u>
	2,205

Including:

Grain	1,440	Including: Summer grain	910
		Winter grain	530
Technical crops	370	Flax seed	55
		Sunflower seed	315
Vegetables	110	Potatoes	40
Fodder grasses	240	Single-year grasses	100
		Perennial grasses	30
		Fodder roots	15
		Grasses	20
		Grasses from prev. yrs.	75

Potatoes from gardens belonging to kolkhoz employees 15

Yield of --- (seeds?) 30
2,205

Fallow land plowed	500
Land plowed in autumn for summer grain	700
Fertilizer spread	40,000 tons

Harvest of the kolkhozes (in dz):

Grain	35
Sunflowers	85
Potatoes	780

(58) b. Yield of vegetable crops:

Total: 338 hectares

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Including:

Two-year crops	47
Root vegetables	160
Perennial grasses	25
Single-year grasses	20
Normal hay mowing	86
	<u>338</u>

Storage of grasses in silos 40,000 tons

(59) c. Kolkhoz gardens (garbled)

(60) d. Planned operations of Machine Tractor Stations at kolkhozes for 1945 (in 1000 hectares)

Spring plowing	83
Field preparation before spring plowing	5
Sowing of summer grain	80
Cultivation of fallow land	17
-----	40
Sowing of winter grain	40
Land plowed in autumn for harvest of summer grain	35
	<u>340.</u>

Grain thrashed at Machine Tractor Stations 20,000 tons.

(61) 2. Ordzhonikidze Kraj (in 1000 hectares)

a. Kolkhozes

To be cultivated in summer	10,750 (?)
To be cultivated in winter	8,000
	<u>18,750</u>

Including:

Grain	15,000	Including: Summer grain	7,500
		Winter grain	7,500

Including:

Summer wheat	500
Summer barley	2,680
Buckwheat	50
Grain-bean mixture	37
Corn	1,850

Technical crops	2,445	Including: Cotton	200
		Linseed	10
		Sunflowers	1,750
		Flax	220
		Castor	150

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		Soy	20
		Mustard	50
		Makhorka	0.15
		Volatile oil plants	30
		Medicinal plants	10
Vegetables	420	Including:	
		Potatoes	180
Fodder			
grasses	2,585	Including:	
		Single-year grasses	200
		Perennial grasses	100
		Fodder grains	55
		Ensilage grasses	30
		Grasses of other	
		years	2,220
			2,585
Potatoes from			
gardens belong-			
ing to kolkhoz			
employees	130		
Sowing of---			
seed (?)	950		
Summer culti-			
vation of			
potatoes	15		
Sowing in pri-			
ivate gardens	0.5	Including:	
		Summer grain	0.2
		Potatoes	0.1
Fallow land plowed		4,000	
Land plowed in autumn for			
harvest of summer grain		6,000	
Fertilizer spread		150,000 tons.	
Harvest at kolkhozes			
Grain		105 dz	
Cotton		30	
Sunflowers		75	
Flax		50	
Potatoes		700.	

(62) b. Yield of vegetable crops

Total: 933 hectares

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Including:	Two-year crops	105
	Root vegetables	400
	Perennial grasses	50
	Single-year grasses	100
	Normal hay mowing	80.

Storage of grasses in silos 232,000 tons.

(63) c. Kolkhoz gardens

Berry	200 hectares
Vineyards	850
Grape hothouses	17.

(64) d. Planned operations of Machine Tractor Stations for 1945
(in 1000 hectares):

Spring plowing	630
Field preparation before spring plowing	100
Sowing of summer grain	650
Cultivation of fallow fields	600
-----	250
Grain harvested by combines	600
Sowing of winter grain	700
Plowing fields for sowing of summer grain	420
	<u>3,950.</u>

Grain thrashed by Machine
 Tractor Stations 5,000 tons.

(65) The secretaries of the Party Organizations of Kabardino-Balkar and Ordzhonikidze Kraj were directed to forward any possible objections or protests concerning the above plans within three days to the NK for Agriculture.

(66) 3. Krasnodar Kraj

The Kraj Executive Committee submitted the following proposals for field cultivation for the spring of 1945 (in 1000 hectares):

Total area under cultivation: 14,000

Including:	Summer grain	9,087	Including:	Wheat	1,400
				Corn	3,000
	Bean crops	5		Castor	100
	Technical crops	3,603		Tobacco	115
	Vegetables	610		Potatoes	160
	Fodder plants	1,900		Hay	250
				Fodder beets	100

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(67) 4. Georgian Republic

The Georgian Central Committee of the Party submitted to the NK for Agriculture the following proposals for 1945:

a. Kolkhozes

Summer sowing: 5,050 hectares

Including:

Grain	4,097
Summer wheat	430
Summer barley	626
Corn	2,950
Millet	10
Rice	---
Beans	10
---	20

Winter sowing: 2,500 hectares

Plowing fallow land in autumn: 75,000 hectares

b. Seed plantations

Perennial grasses	1,700
---	1,600
Single-year grasses	200

c. Vineyard kolkhozes 135

(Plus the assignment to guarantee 2,000,000 grapevine cuttings)

d. Machine Tractor Stations

Spring plowing	75,000
Summer sowing	25,000
Winter sowing	45,000

(68) 5. Dagestan Republic

On 1 December the following condition of agricultural operations was announced:

Area to be plowed for autumn cultivation	3,286 hectares (?)
Plowed	31,981
Other operations	7,013
Harrowed	183,903
Unplowed fallow land	13,587
Plowed in preparation for spring planting	7,409.

Note: Hectare figures have been taken directly from Russian communications, and in some cases contradictions occur. For example, for Krasnodar Kraj the total seeded area is given as 14 million hectares, or 140,000 square kilometers, but the total field area of the Kraj amounts to only 81,000 square kilometers. The same numerical relationship applies for all other figures given for total field area.

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(69) 6. Rostov Oblast'

Plowing assigned for sowing summer grain at sovkhoses of the Sovkhoztrust was carried out unsatisfactorily. In the period from 11 through 15 November only 2,495 hectares were plowed. The Sovkhoztrust was directed to intensify the work because ample fuel was available.

(70) 7. Ordzhonikidze Kraj

In order to establish improved supplies of seed, the following measures were ordered by the Kraj Executive Committee on authority of the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the Union:

1. Only especially high-quality grain and leguminous plant areas should be sowed. In 1945 these areas should make up 75% of the fields under cultivation.
2. During 1946 there must be a seed plantation available in every administrative rajon. In 1945 an additional 20 new seed plantations are to be established.
3. In 1945 high-quality seed should be collected from 675,000 hectares of land.
4. During 1945, 12,000 tons of high-quality seed grain are to be furnished to the Government seed stockpile.
5. In order to administer cultivation of seed grains in the rajons, 40 persons are to be trained in 6-month courses.

(71) 8. Azerbajdzhan Republic

The winter crop seemed to be beset with difficulties. Over 40,000 hectares of winter crop land were destroyed by fieldmice.

F. Conservation Measures

(72) As already reported in above messages, an intensive campaign was undertaken to set up reserve stocks. Thus, the following was determined:

Rostov/Don Oblast' - the following were stored in October and November:

19,500 tons	Rye
53,100	Wheat
9,400	Barley
3,000	Millet;

The following were stored in December:

5,000 tons	Rye
15,000	Wheat
10,000	Barley, plus an additional 15,000 tons of unspecified bread grains.

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(73) Storage of sunflower seed and seed potatoes, as well as that of fodder grasses, appeared to be progressing poorly. As of 10 December the following had been stored by kolkhozes of the Oblast':

Sunflower seed	40% of plan
Seed potatoes	18
Fodder grasses	24
Summer grain seed	69.

(74) In December bread grain was to be stored at Government Emergency Reserve bases as follows:

Peredovaya	2,080 tons
Rasshevatskaya	240
Karamyetskaya	6,110
Petrovskij	1,690
Georgevskij	2,080
Blagodarnenskaya	3,900
Spitsevskaya	2,600
Izobilenskaya	910
Cherkassk	2,600
Mineral'nye Vody	210
Budennovsk	4,030
Divensk	2,080
Stavropol	2,080
---	1,560
	33,770 tons.

(75) An additional supplementary storage of 4,600 tons was planned for by the end of December. In addition to the amounts above, at the end of December storage of 50,000 tons of wheat was reported.

(76) Georgian Republic

In November 40,000 tons of bread grain were stored and 19,000 tons were stored in December.

(77) Armenian Republic

In December 20,000 tons of grain were to be stored for the government stockpile.

(78) Groznyj Oblast'

According to a report from the Oblast' Party Committee to the Central Committee of the Party in Moscow, through 25 December 1944 the kolkhozes of Groznyj Oblast' had prepared 89% of planned collection of seed products for spring sowing. In detail the following were prepared:

3,500 tons grain seed products	or 89% of plan,
373 " vegetable oil plant seeds	" 120% " "
3,008 " seed potatoes	" 80% " "

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II. Potatoes and Vegetables

(79) On 1 December the Oblast' Party Committee of Rostov/Don Oblast' issued the following report:

On 1 December the vegetable delivery plan established by the Government at 82,230 tons for the Oblast' was 100% fulfilled.

(80) The potato procurement plan was fulfilled as follows:

	<u>Planned</u>	<u>Actual</u>	
Kolkhozes	11,847 tons	4,032 tons	= 38%
Individual farms	5,310	1,232	23%
Auxiliary farms	300	141	47%

(81) From many other messages it could be determined that a serious shortage of potatoes prevailed in Rostov/Don Oblast'.

(82) A poor potato harvest was also reported in the Azerbajdzhan Republic .

(83) It was reported on 4 December from Ordzhonikidze Kraj that the delivery plan for fresh vegetables had been completely fulfilled. The 1,000 tons of dried and preserved vegetables were expected to be delivered in the near future.

(84) The Turkmen Republic was to procure 4,056 tons of potatoes and 12,874 tons of vegetables according to plan in 1944. Actually, 825 tons of potatoes and 12,810 tons of vegetables were procured. The potatoes procured were completely consumed by 25 December. The vegetables were to be salted or dried in small quantities. Storage of the preserved vegetables was considered satisfactory.

(85) Few messages were noted which referred to results of the fruit harvest. There appears to have been a poor fruit harvest in the Turkmen Republic. Only 18% of the planned amount of dried fruit could be produced.

III. Livestock Raising

(86) The extremely few messages referring to livestock raising intercepted in the fourth quarter make it impossible either to form a comparison with the three preceding quarters or to compile information for a survey of the industry.

(87) A. Livestock Breeding

Plan fulfillment in Rostov/Don Oblast' by percent:

Horses	61%
Cattle	110
Sheep	98
Hogs	94
Cows	103

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Breeding sheep	97%
Sows	86
Oxen (older than two years)	96
Calves (castrated), to be raised for draft oxen	187

Plan fulfillment of young livestock reared:

Foals	85%
Calves	91
Lambs	88
Suckling pigs	89

Purchased (from other regions?):

Lambs	10,000
Hogs	900

(88) Milk production amounted to 88% of plan.

(89) In kolkhozes of the Oblast¹ breeding houses were established during 1944 for:

1,748 head Cattle	
1,546	Sheep
1,253	Hogs.

(90) The following were procured for fodder:

462,000 tons Hay
748,000 Straw.

(91) Data on shelters for livestock are as follows:

	<u>Repaired</u>	<u>On hand</u>	<u>Required</u>
Stalls for horses	32,000	38,000	28,000
Large cattle	270,000	335,000	31,000
Sheep	467,000	608,000	645,000
Hogs	55,000	67,000	52,000

	<u>Personnel on hand</u>	<u>Personnel required</u>
General custodian personnel	3,371	3,732
Horse tenders and herdsmen	3,507	3,996
Milkmaids	4,792	5,611
Tenders for young livestock	274 (?)	3,823
Cattle tenders	4,269 (?)	532 (?)
Ox drivers	4,820	5,5-3 (?)
Shepherds	3,662	4,006
Hog tenders	2,162	2,409.

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(92) By the end of 1945 the following results of the livestock raising program in the Oblast' were to have been achieved: In the kolkhozes a total of 60,000 hogs including 16,000 breeders were to be on hand. 40,000 of the hogs were to be stall-fattened. The hogs were to weigh at least 80 kilograms each.

(93) Armenian Republic

By the end of 1944 the following stock of livestock was to exist:

Oxen	292,000 head
Sheep and goats	700,000
Hogs	26,000.

(94) The livestock raising plan for 1945 was as follows:

Cattle	308,000 head including 55,000 cows and 116,000 oxen
Sheep and goats	850,000 460,000 breeders
Hogs	32,000 10,000 breeders (?)

(95) B. Fodder Production

Exactly as in the first, second and third quarters, a bottleneck in fodder procurement was also noted in the fourth quarter. This was partly the result of transportation difficulties and partly the result of low fodder stocks. Thus, for example, during September and October, the Meat Trust in Rostov/Don could dispatch only 720 tons of cattle fodder to the cattle fodder bases instead of the authorized 900 tons because of a shortage of stocks. Likewise, the Cattle Procurement Office could provide only 854 tons of hay for cattle in shipment during the same period instead of the 1,100 tons planned. The latter example resulted from insufficient shipping capacity on the Lower Don.

(96) According to reports from Dagestan, no hay was on hand because of drought. Other types of rough fodder were not sufficient to cover the period when the cattle would be in stalls.

IV. General Supply

(97) A. Bread Supply

Potatoes were used in the production of bread in larger and larger proportions. The Chief Bread Supply Office in Ordzhonikidze Kraj issued the order that up to 10% potatoes was to be used in the production of bread. The potatoes were first to be cooked, then mashed and then added to the bread. In Rostov/Don Oblast' the Oblast' Trade Department received the following authorization containing data on the admixture of potatoes in bread production:

Grain flour	9,010 tons
Potatoes for bread production	1,320
Barley	60
Macaroni products	210
Potatoes	1,350 as substitute for barley.

(98) Macaroni factories received the following plans:

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<u>Macaroni factory</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Amount</u>
Krasnodar	Fourth quarter	170 tons
	November	60
Rostov/Don	Fourth quarter	450
	November	160
Taganrog	Fourth quarter	290
	November	90
Baku	December	550.

(99) B. Supply of Meat and Dairy Products

Exactly as in the first, second and third quarters of 1944, it was also determined in the fourth quarter that the meat supply was generally satisfactory. Some offices overfulfilled their plans.

(100) The Meat Procurement Office in Salsk had fulfilled their fourth quarter plan by 108% as early as 15 November. 745 dz of meat were to be procured, and 809 dz were actually delivered.

(101) In Makhachkala the Meat Combine pledged itself to produce 550 tons of meat, 100 tons of sausage and 285 tons of processed meat in the period from 1 September to 7 November over and above the 500 tons of meat and 50 tons of sausage planned.

(102) There were cases of nonfulfillment of plan, as, for example, at the Meat Combine in Nal'chik. Here, in the period from 1 through 10 September only 28 tons of cattle were slaughtered.

(103) Technical difficulties were also noted. The refrigeration stations of the Georgian Meat Combine were not working, so cattle slaughtering operations could not be carried out.

(104) At the Meat Combine in Semipalatinsk not enough packing material could be produced because of deficient timber deliveries, and delivery obligations could not be met.

(105) Poor results were noted at dairies. For example, the Azerbajdzhan NK for Trade received only 460 tons of dairy products in October and November instead of the 1,600 tons planned. Georgian dairies could provide expectant and nursing mothers with only half of the planned full-milk products during the fourth quarter.

(106) Plan fulfillment could be noted at one location only, at Krasnodar. The dairies of the Kraj reported the following plan fulfillment for October:

Milk products	100%
Butter	71
Eggs	100

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(107) C. Fish Supply

The Offices of the NK for Fishing in Rostov/Don issued the following report for the third quarter: 3,491 persons were employed including 753 women and 537 youths.

(108) In the first ten-day period of November 3,700 dz of fish were caught; since the beginning of the fourth quarter 15,143 dz.

(109) In Rostov/Don Oblast' and in the Dagestan SSR a serious shortage of fish prevailed. This was caused, on one hand, by not especially successful fishing and, on the other, by poor transportation facilities.

(110) The Dagestan Fish Trust in Makhachkala could not meet its delivery obligations to the Transcaucasus Front.

(111) According to a report of 18 November, at the Combine "Rostov-Ugol" in Shakhty consumers received only 97 tons of fish in the fourth quarter instead of the 455 tons planned.

(112) According to a report from the Chief Directorate for Fish Sales in Moscow, an extraordinarily poor fish catch occurred in the entire Soviet Union.

(113) The following message presents information on transportation conditions on the Caspian Sea:

In November an office of the Chief Directorate for Fish Sales was to receive 400 tons of fish from the Fish Trust in Kislyar and 1,400 tons from the Dagestan Fish Trust. However, only 60 tons of fish were received from the former, and only 120 tons from the latter.

(114) In Rostov/Don deliveries of fish products in the fourth quarter amounted to only 30% of those in the third quarter.

(115) D. Salt Supply

The following salt extraction results were achieved:

Baksol (Baku)	in September	8,040 tons salt
	in October	8,400
	1-20 November	3,750
Nakhichevan	----	3,465.

(116) The Salt Extraction Office in Nakhichevan reported the following shipments:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Ordered</u>	<u>Shipped</u>	<u>Consignee</u>	
19 Nov	15 cars	9 cars including	Armenian villages	4 cars
			"Sovpren"	3
			Azerbaijdzhan villages	2

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<u>Date</u>	<u>Ordered</u>	<u>Shipped</u>	<u>Consignee</u>	
20 Nov	15 cars	9 (sic)	Georgian Republic "Sovpren"	1 car 6
21 Nov	No shipments because of nondelivery of railroad cars			
22 Nov	15	9	"Sovpren" Storage Base #4 (?)	2 7
23 Nov	15	7	"Sovpren" Azerbaijdzhan villages	6 1.

(117) E. Supply of Vegetable Fats and Oils

Very good results were achieved by the Vegetable Oil Sales Office in Groznyj. By 20 September 1,774 tons of vegetable oil had been produced, thus fulfilling the plan for the year. Results at the Vegetable Fats and Oils Sales Office in Tbilisi were also satisfactory. On 16 September 14 tons of refined palm oil were produced, and 8 tons were produced on 21 September. By 1 October the Azerbaijdzhan Vegetable Fat and Oil Directorate had made the following deliveries:

For Special Trade	18.1 tons
Military Canteens	28.4
Railroad Restaurant Directorate	3.5
Fishery Consumers Union	8.1
Oil Industry	38.0
Chemical Industry	12.3
Maritime Shipping Industry	85.3
Inland Shipping Industry	9.9
NK for Textiles	16.0
NK for Construction Materials	2.1
NK for Light Industry	2.1
NK for Transportation	40.9
Chief Directorate for Oil Supply	3.0

(118) In addition, 336 tons of vegetable fats were issued to the following organizations in non-public trade:

Central Asia Military Okrug	165 tons
Organizations of the NKVD	47
Cotton ...	75
NK for the Food Industry	27
Fisheries of the Turkmen SSR	13.

(119) F. Supply of Luxury Items

In the Soviet Alcohol Industry certain difficulties occurred because of insufficient shipments of grain necessary for the production of alcohol. Thus, the Alcohol Plant in Groznyj could not bring in 1,527 tons of grain because of a lack of gasoline. Nevertheless, there was an urgent contract to produce 100,000 liters of alcoholic beverages.

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(120) The Alcohol Plant in Krasnodar was forced to cease operations because of a lack of mazut and coal.

(121) The Cigarette Industry suffered great difficulties because of a shortage of special paper.

(122) G. Delivery Results from Individual Trade Offices

Georgian Republic

In the third quarter the delivery quota of the NK for Trade was fulfilled 100% as follows:

1,251 tons	Meat products
296	Animal fat
220	Cheese.

(123) Azerbaijdzhan Republic

In neither the third nor the fourth quarter was the delivery quota of the Azerbaijdzhan NK for Trade completely fulfilled. Deliveries were as follows:

(in the third quarter)

Fish	864 tons = 56% of the third quarter quota
Meat products	1,277 81
Animal fat	291 88

(in the fourth quarter)

Fish products	520 tons = 52% of all authorizations
Meat products	1,540 55
Animal fat	231 95
Cheese	64 53
Milk	830 2
Vegetable fat	440 44
Sugar	256 126
Sugar goods	453 67.

(124) As a result of nonfulfillment of the fishing program by the NK for Fishing, the market presumably could not be completely supplied with fish products. In October the fishing program was fulfilled by 31% and in November by 43%.

(125) In order to assure a complete supply of meat products, substitutes were resorted to. The 74 tons of dried eggs which were sent did not cover existing requirements, and a supplementary allocation of 120 tons was needed. Supplies to the market of vegetable fat were delayed because the question of release of 420 tons of "shorting" (preserved fish?) had not as yet been definitely decided. As a result of insufficient supplies of dried milk, by the end of the quarter a deficiency of 170 tons of milk could not be avoided.

(126) According to a report from the Azerbaijdzhan NK for Trade, the requirements of medical institutions for animal and vegetable fat could not once be met.

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SECURITY INFORMATION(127) Rostov/Don Oblast'

In October the following discrepancies arose in the Oblast': The following were required to supply the civilian population on the basis of food authorizations:

9,836 tons Flour
1,000 Barley.

For this period the following were allocated:

9,010 tons Flour
270 Barley
2,470 Potatoes (instead of 330 tons of flour
and 270 tons of barley).

(128) As there were no potatoes in the Oblast', reduction of the flour and barley allotments for civilian supply resulted in an extremely serious situation. The Oblast' Executive Committee, therefore, requested an additional allotment for October of 826 tons of flour and 260 tons of barley, and also sought authorization to use barley instead of potatoes as an admixture in the manufacture of bread.

(129) The supply situation at Rostov medical institutions also left much to be desired: during the fourth quarter, food for only 3,000 patients was issued instead of for 7,400 as was required.

(130) Ordzhonikidze Kraj

In the Kraj the NKVD Prison Directorate complained that too little food had been allotted to prisoners.

(131) The following prices for potatoes and vegetables in the Kabardino-Balkar Republic were noted on 24 October:

1 kilogram Potatoes	0.65 rubles
Fresh cabbage	0.40
Preserved cabbage	1.20
Leeks	2.--
Beets	1.30
Carrots	0.50
Fresh cucumbers	0.50
Salted cucumbers	1.--.

(132) Food Rationing

Just as in the first, second and third quarters, a definite division of the different levels of supply could not be established in the fourth quarter. Rations noted for the last quarter of 1944 are as follows:

At coal enterprises

On the basis of a decree of the "GOKO" on 24 December 1944, the following increased ration schedule was set up for workers at plants of the NK for Coal who worked under especially unhealthy conditions:

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Bread	1,000 grams per day
Meat or fish	3,200 monthly
Fat	900
Barley or macaroni	2,000
Sugar or sweets	5,000.

(133) On the basis of another decree of the "GOKO" in October 1944, beginning with October, all day workers in the coal mines were to receive a daily cold breakfast ration in addition to normal rations as follows:

100 grams	Bread
50	Pork grease
10	Sugar.

Workers and other employees who fulfilled their working norms and delivery quotas by less than 80% were not to be issued the cold breakfast ration. Issuance of the breakfast ration was dependent on production from the previous day.

(134) At enterprises of the NK for the Merchant Fleet

(per man per month)	? grams	Meat
	200	Fish (?)
	600	Fat
	1,500	Barley and macaroni
	500	Sugar and sweets
	700	Bread (daily).

(135) At enterprises of the NK for Aircraft Construction

(per man per month)	500 grams	Fish or meat
	200	Fat
	600	Barley and macaroni
	200 (?)	Pastry goods.

(136) At Trade Schools

(per man per month)	3.7 kilograms	Meat or fish
	0.9	Fat
	3.0	Barley and macaroni
	0.5	Sugar and sweets
	0.03	Tea
	4.5	Milk.

(137) At a Sanatorium of the Red Army

(per man per day)	200 grams	Meat
	50	Fish
	30	Caviar, preserved fish or salmon
	100	Butter
	100	Sugar
	200	Fresh fruits or 310 grams of preserved fruits
	35	Sour cream
	25	White cheese
	10	Rice
	20	Wheat grits.

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3. Metal Supply

I. Scrap Collection and Processing

(138) In the last quarter the same intense activity in scrap collection and delivery was observed as that which prevailed in the three preceding quarters. According to intercepted messages, plans seemed generally to be fulfilled.

(139) In detail, the following could be determined:

Azerbaijdzhan Republic: from 1 through 15 October, scrap metal was

	<u>Procured</u>	<u>Shipped</u>	<u>Processed</u>
Planned	2,633 tons	2,633 tons	2,323 tons
Actual fulfillment	2,665	2,851	2,207

(140) Armenian Republic: In the fourth quarter the Republic had procured and shipped the following:

300 tons	Steel scrap
100	Cast iron scrap
100	Metal shavings.

(141) Ordzhonikidze Kraj: The plan assigned for the fourth quarter was fulfilled as follows:

<u>Planned</u>	<u>Actual Fulfillment</u>	<u>Shipped</u>
3,000 tons	5,750 tons	2,900 tons.

(142) Rostov/Don Oblast': Through 6 December 20,638 tons of scrap were collected and 17,850 tons shipped in the Oblast'. Collection and shipment in the fourth quarter were as follows:

<u>Planned</u>	<u>Actual Fulfillment</u>	<u>Shipped</u>
4,000 tons	5,066 tons	4,151 tons.

(143) In the first ten-day period of December the Non-ferrous Metal Scrap Collection Points had procured the following:

Copper	20 tons
Brass	14
Lead	5
Aluminum	22
Others	2
Shipped	95.

(144) Turkmen Republic: In the fourth quarter the Republic was to procure and ship the following:

2,200 tons	Steel scrap
400	Cast iron scrap
400	Metal shavings.

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II. General Supply Situation

(145) In the last quarter a serious shortage of cast iron was generally noted. In detail the following was determined:

October:

In general, a serious shortage of iron, steel and cast iron scrap prevailed during the month of October. The shortages were partly caused by strained transportation facilities, as indicated, for example, in the following message:

"At the Stalin Plant in Taganrog over 5,000 tons of metal shavings have been collected. The North Caucasus Railroad refuses to furnish railroad cars even though they were already authorized. As a result, shipment of metal shavings to the Enakievo Plant has been disrupted for three months.

(146) The shortages were also partly the result of an actual lack of iron and steel scrap. During the fourth quarter only 6,300 tons of scrap could be authorized for the Plant "Granit" in Baku instead of 8,100 tons.

(147) The shortage of cast iron was especially serious in various branches of industry. Examples of this follow.

(148) Novocherkassk: The Plant "Nikol'skij" contracted for 60 tons of cast iron from "Gora" at Tula. The lack of cast iron prevented the fulfillment of a Government contract for reconstruction of mines in the Donbass.

(149) Voroshilovsk: The Plant "Stal" was to expedite shipment of 20 tons of cast iron to the Technical Oil Industry Supply Office in Groznyj. Because of a lack of cast iron, production of spare parts for machines for the Oil Industry was halted.

(150) Taganrog: "Trubostal" urgently required cast iron. Delivery of 1,500 tons of cast iron from Konstantinovka was not carried out as planned.

(151) Groznyj: The plant of the Technical Oil Supply Office could not manage with the 100 tons of cast iron scrap allocated. The plant in Makeevka was to deliver an additional 200 tons.

(152) Taganrog: According to a message from "Trubostal" to the Deputy to the Peoples' Commissar for Transportation in Moscow (copies to the Deputy to the Peoples' Commissar for Iron and to "Glavtrubostal"), the 1,500 tons of cast iron which were contracted for shipment in October from the "Frunze" Plant in Konstantinovka to the "Andreev" Plant, could not be delivered because of a lack of railway cars. Permission was requested to procure railway cars in excess of plan from the South Donets Railway.

(153) A lack of semi-finished goods was likewise noted. Thus, at Plant No. 765 packing of ammunition had to be halted because of a lack of iron strip, and the "Andreev" Plant could deliver only 643 tons of tin plate in October instead of 920 tons because of a lack of rolled metal.

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(154) November:

In November, a shortage of ferro-manganese and metal scraps was added to the shortage of cast iron noted in October. The Plant in Krasnyj Sulin was forced to halt production of steel products because of a lack of ferro-manganese. The Plant "Trubostal" received only 631 tons of metal scrap by 15 November instead of the 2,750 tons required. Production of articles to meet daily requirements was likewise greatly limited because of a lack of iron scraps in Rostov/Don Oblast'. As a result of the cast iron shortage, difficulties arose at the "Andreev" Plant in Taganrog, at agricultural repair shops in Pyatigorsk and Cherkassk, at the metal processing plants of the Azerbajdzhan Oil Combine and at the Oil Combines in Groznyj and Krasnodar. At Plant No. 613 (location not specified) munition production had to be halted, and at the Plant "Krasnyj Molot" in Groznyj manufacture of tractors and pumps had to be halted. Unsatisfactory deliveries of tin affected production at the plants of "Trubostal" in Taganrog and at the Railroad Car Plant in Kalinin. A serious shortage of tubing arose at the Plants "Instrument" and "Kotelshchik" in Taganrog. Shortages of rolled iron, mine rails and metal alloys, particularly at plants of the NK for Armaments, were also noted.

(155) The Technical Oil Supply Office in Azerbajdzhan could not make delivery of the required amount of bronze to a subordinate plant.

(156) December:

During December a continuance of the cast iron shortage was not confirmed, but a shortage of steel was noted. For example, because of a lack of steel in Lyubertsy at the Plant "Avangard" production of agricultural machines had to be interrupted, and at the Plant "Instrument" in Taganrog punching operations had to be halted. Reconstruction of cokerries at the Oil Enterprises in Groznyj had to be halted for the same reason.

(157) At a steel working plant in Baku production of special products had to be halted because of a shortage of round steel, and at the Repair Shops of the NK for Agriculture the repair of tractors during the autumn and winter months had to be interrupted also.

III. Production at Certain Plants

(158) The following data present figures on production results, ore and fuel turnover, and conclusions as to the possible capacities of certain plants:

Foundry in Stalino: Turnover of ore and heating material on 1 October -

	<u>Iron Ore</u>	<u>Manganese Ore</u>	<u>Cast Iron</u>	<u>Scrap Iron</u>
Arrived	1,093 tons	- tons	34 tons	103 tons
Consumed	1,492	88	34	103
On Hand	56,927	581	802	13,443.

	<u>Ferro-silicon</u>	<u>Ferro-manganese</u>	<u>Limestone</u>	<u>Metal shavings</u>
Arrived	- tons	- tons	235 tons	165 tons
Consumed	3	4	654	165
On hand	88	23	324	-.

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	<u>Gas Coal</u>	<u>Low Quality Coal</u>	<u>Anthracite</u>	<u>Coke</u>	<u>Heating Mazut</u>
Arrived	16 tons	28 tons	- tons	979 tons	199 tons
Consumed	46	78	-	1,167	149
On hand	38	638	1,022	6,121	504.

(159) Foundry in Krasnyj Sulin: Stocks and turnover -

On 21 October the following turnover of heating material was noted:

	<u>Arrived</u>	<u>Consumed</u>
Anthracite	51 tons	159 tons
Mazut	91	24.

Stocks:

On 16 November	3,320 tons Iron ore
	1,202 Manganese ore
	1,320 Limestone
	1,002 Quartzite
On 1 December	1,300 tons Iron ore
	1,090 Manganese ore
	1,200 Limestone
	1,000 Quartzite
On 3 December	1,695 tons Cast iron
	50 Basic slag
	12 Ferro-manganese.

(160) Plant of "Trubostal" in Taganrog: In November 750 railroad cars of iron were to be shipped. In December the following shipments were to be received:

<u>Amount</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Consignor</u>
100 tons	Iron ore	Krivoj Rog
800	Manganese ore	Chiatura
198	Limestone	Kara-Kub
1 railroad car	Fluorspar	Arkhangel'sk.

(161) On 1 December the plant received an order from the NK for Iron to complete by 5 December fulfillment of all contracts from October and November, i. e., to produce the following:

356 tons	Sheeting
162	Gas piping
100	Oil pipeline sections
1,130	Feed pipes.

Moreover, the plant was ordered to complete and ship by 25 December all orders for the NK for Oil as follows:

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144 tons Sheetting
170 Rolled tubing
30 Oil pipeline sections
1,100 Feed pipes.

Shipments to the NK for Oil were to be given the same priority as shipments to the Armaments Industry.

(162) Plant "Ilich" in Mariupol': In the third ten-day period of November the Plant "Ilich" was to ship 18,000 tons of metal products, but actually only 9,855 tons were shipped. Nonfulfillment of the plan was a result of the cessation of operations at the rolling mill because of the fuel shortage.

(163) Plant of the Mortar Industry in Krasnodar: From 11 through 16 October the plant had the following turnover of metals:

	<u>Intake:</u>	<u>Consumption:</u>	<u>On hand:</u>
Cast Iron	20 t	8 t	17 t
Iron Sheet 1mm	34 t	5 t	38 t
Iron Sheet 2mm	20 t	5 t	15 t

(164) Plant "Bolt" in Khabarovsk: For the first quarter of 1945 the following scrap processing plan was established for the plant:

Processing	80 t
Deliveries to "Vtorchermet"	150 t

(165) In November the copper rolling mill in Tbilisi produced 28 tons of copper products.

4. Coal Supply

(166) A. Transportation Difficulties:

In domestic radio traffic information was intercepted only concerning the Rostov-Ugol Combine in Shakhty. The intercepted messages presented a clear picture of the scope of transportation difficulties which were especially serious with respect to the coal supply situation. We may assume that these difficulties did not pertain only to the Rostov-Ugol Combine, but to the transportation situation at all other large coal supply centers.

(167) Some examples of transportation difficulties follow:

During 20 days of October too few railroad cars were provided as follows:

North Caucasus Railway	5,321 railroad cars
Southeast Railway	143 " "
North Donets Railway	551 " "
Stalingrad Railway	716 " "

Half of the empty cars which arrived were not suitable for the transportation of coal.

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(168) In order to assure coal shipments the following measures were considered necessary:

1. The NK for Transportation was to see to it that the North Caucasus Railway provided usable empty railroad cars.
2. At the places where coal trains were assembled, special attention was to be given that no damaged cars were sent to the North Caucasus Railway.
3. In order that railroad car walls might be repaired by employees of the North Caucasus Railway a considerable quantity of wood was provided monthly because the construction of walls from reeds and bushes consumed an extraordinarily long time.
4. The other railway lines were to provide empty coal cars to the North Caucasus Railway precisely according to the plan of the NK for Transportation.

(169) Interminable delays resulted in loading operations because of the lack of mechanical loading equipment and during night work because of a shortage of sufficient electric lighting.

(170) From 1 through 11 October loading operations proceeded as follows - only 64% of the plan was fulfilled:

6,596 railroad cars with 138,516 tons of coal were ordered but only 4,258 cars with 88,790 tons of coal were provided and dispatched.

(171) At the end of October it was reported that about 400,000 tons of coal had accumulated at the mine pits of the Rostov-Ugol Combine. Of this, about 247,000 tons were on the loading ramps of the railway. On 29 October the situation seemed to become unbearable and the following message was intercepted:

"To Moscow, NK for Transportation, Comrade Kaganovich, copy to Moscow, NK for Coal, Comrade Vakhrushchev.

"Coal shipments are proceeding especially poorly. For three months the Combine has repeatedly reported work arrears. This is the fault of the North Caucasus Railway which furnishes from 200 to 300 railroad cars too few every day. As a result, the Combine can fulfill the shipping plan only by 60 to 65%. The mines are overflowing with coal. On the railroad spur lines of the Combine are stored over 100,000 tons of coal. As a result of a shortage of shipping, some mines will have to cease operations in the near future. This condition has prevailed for three months. If the North Caucasus Railway does not improve the delivery of railroad cars, the Combine can never fulfill the assigned plans. I urgently request that you meet the Combine half way in this matter. We have coal and transport workers; only cars are lacking. For three months the Combine has been blamed for not having fulfilled plans. I request that you assume responsibility for this situation. I repeat: the blame for non-fulfillment of shipping plans falls solely on the North Caucasus Railway and its chief, Kalabukhov.

Rostov-Ugol, Chief of the Combine, Kartashev."

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(172) On 31 October 1944 the following answer to the above message was received:

"Rostov/Don to the Chief of the Combine "Rostov-Ugol." Points 1, 4, and 9 of Decree No. 6832 of 29 October 1944 from the GOKO are hereby reported. The State Committee for Defense has noted non-fulfillment of the coal shipping plan in October. An intolerable situation has arisen. The limited coal stocks which were for needs of the railroads and industry during the winter months are already being consumed. The State Committee for Defense charges to the Chief of the North Donets Railway, Krivonosov, the Chief of the South Donets Railway, Larionov, the Chief of the North Caucasus Railway, Kalabukhov, as well as to the chiefs of the coal combines, "Stalino-Ugol," Zaryad'ko, "Voroshilov-Ugol," Voruchenko, "Rostov-Ugol," Kartashev, and the first Secretaries of the Oblast' Party Committees of Stalino Oblast', Melnikov, Voroshilovgrad Oblast', Graev, and Rostov Oblast', Aleksandryuk, for non-fulfillment of the plan for shipping Donets coal which is of prime importance for supplying railways near the front. The State Committee for Defense considers fulfillment of the coal shipping plan one of the most important military-economic assignments and orders the following:

Point 1: The People's Commissar for Transportation, Kaganovich, for Coal, Vakhrushev, the Representative of the Chief Directorate for Coal Supply on the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the Union, Kurgashev, the chiefs of the Southeast, Stalingrad, North Caucasus and North Donets Railways, and the chief of the Coal Supply Office at Rostov are charged with the assignment to increase coal shipments from the "Rostov-Ugol" Combine. The following quantities are to be shipped daily:

Southeast Railway:

from 30 to 31 October	65 railroad cars = 1,360 tons
from 1 to 8 November	48 " = 1,010 "

Stalingrad Railway:

from 30 to 31 October	95 railroad cars = 2,000 tons
from 1 to 8 November	92 " = 1,930 "

North Caucasus Railway:

from 30 to 31 October	680 railroad cars = 14,280 tons
from 1 to 8 November	734 " = 15,414 "

North Donets Railway:

from 30 to 31 October	116 railroad cars = 2,440 tons
from 1 to 8 November	121 " = 2,550 "

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Point 4: The First Secretary of the Oblast' Party Committee of Rostov Oblast', Aleksandryuk, is to conscript 1,000 persons for work at the "Rostov-Ugol" Combine by 1 January 1945. Moreover, the necessary loading machines, trucks, and horse-drawn transport facilities are to be procured.

Point 9: The chiefs of the railways serving the coal combines, the chiefs of the coal supply offices, and the first secretaries of the oblast' party committees are hereby informed that they have been personally charged by the State Committee for Defense for the responsibility for exact fulfillment of the coal shipping contracts in the above amounts. In event of non-fulfillment of the contract, absolutely no excuse will be tolerated. Progress reports are to be submitted at the beginning of November to the State Committee for Defense.

Signed: Chairman of the State Committee for Defense, J. Stalin.

(173) According to this order, daily planned shipments from 30 to 31 October were to amount to 956 railroad cars of 20,080 tons of coal, and from 1 to 8 November to 995 railroad cars or 20,904 tons of coal. During the first, second, and third quarters of 1944 the highest daily shipping plan for the "Rostov-Ugol" Combine amounted to 8,597 tons and that of the Coal Supply Office in Rostov 8,640 tons, a total of 17,237 tons. The highest totals actually shipped were 5,882 and 8,666 tons of coal respectively, a total of 14,548 tons.

(174) The signature of Stalin seems to have had its effect because the next reports on shipments presented an improved picture. The following results were achieved:

On 30 October:

North Caucasus Railway:

Planned:	680 railroad cars	= 14,280 tons
Ordered:	700 "	= 14,700 tons
Furnished and shipped:	? "	= 11,046 tons

Southeast Railway:

Planned:	65 railroad cars	= 1,360 tons
Ordered:	65 "	= 1,360 tons
Furnished and shipped:	48 "	= 1,050 tons

North Donets Railway:

Planned:	116 railroad cars	= 2,440 tons
Ordered:	74 "	= 1,555 tons
Furnished and shipped:	64 "	= 1,332 tons

Stalingrad Railway:

Planned:	95 railroad cars	= 2,000 tons
Ordered:	95 "	= 2,000 tons
Furnished and shipped:	? "	= 1,226 tons

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(175) In total the Combine had to ship 20,080 tons - 956 railroad cars. 940 railroad cars for 19,746 tons were ordered and 687 railroad cars giving a capacity to ship 14,654 tons were provided and shipped. Responsibility for insufficient delivery of railroad cars was assumed by the North Caucasus Railway. On 31 October 700 railroad cars for 14,700 tons of coal were ordered from the North Caucasus Railway. However, only 577 railroad cars for 12,000 tons of coal were provided.

(176) 1st ten-day period in November:

<u>Railway:</u>	<u>Planned:</u>	<u>Ordered:</u>	<u>Furnished:</u>	<u>Shipped:</u>
North Caucasus Railway	7,340 rr cars = 154,200 t	7,422 rr cars = 156,132 t	6,153 rr cars = 129,018 t	5,676 rr cars = 119,196 t
Southeast Railway	480 rr cars = 10,100 t	532 rr cars = 11,220 t	461 rr cars = 10,008 t	452 rr cars = 9,833 t
North Donets Railway	1,210 rr cars = 25,500 t	1,033 rr cars = 21,630 t	887 rr cars = 18,619 t	857 rr cars = 18,003 t
Stalingrad Railway	920 rr cars = 19,320 t	934 rr cars = 19,908 t	689 rr cars = 14,480 t	686 rr cars = 14,423 t
Total	9,950 rr cars = 209,120 t	9,918 rr cars = 208,890 t	8,190 rr cars = 172,225 t	7,671 rr cars = 161,505 t

(177) On 27 November:

	<u>Ordered</u>	<u>Furnished:</u>	<u>Shipped:</u>
North Caucasus Railway	746 rr cars	599 rr cars	499 rr cars = 10,868 t
Southeast Railway	44 "	17 "	15 " = 374 t
North Donets Railway	90 "	65 "	60 " = 1,216 t
Stalingrad Railway	85 "	75 "	55 " = 1,124 t

(178) The role of truck shipments in the coal situation is indicated by the following order from the Peoples' Commissar for Coal, Vakhrushev, and the Chief of the Chief Directorate of Motorized Troops of the Red Army, Lt. Gen. Tyagunov:

Requisition for trucks to transport coal from mines to shipping points:

1. Regiment Cmdr. Col. Nabokov, is directed to divide up the trucks and dispatch them to the individual mines of the Combines "Stalin-Ugol", "Voroshilovgrad-Ugol", and "Rostov-Ugol". Division of the trucks according to the coal shipping plans at the individual combines is to be determined by the representative of the Peoples' Commissars, Comrade Savchenko.
2. Regiment Cmdr. Col. Nabokov, is held fully responsible for the fulfillment of the coal shipping plans at the individual battalions, as well as for organizing the proper utilization, repair and upkeep of the trucks.

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3. In order to assure smooth execution of the work of the entire regiment, the following are to serve as representatives of the chiefs of the combines in the coal transportation negotiations: For the "Voroshilovgrad-Ugol" Combine, the Regiment Cmdr. Col. Nabokov, headquarters located together with the regiment headquarters in Voroshilovgrad. For the "Stalin-Ugol" Combine, deputy Rgt. Cmdr. Major Antonov, headquarters at the Stalino Combine. For the "Rostov-Ugol" Combine, Battalion Cmdr. Capt. Radchenko, headquarters at battalion headquarters in Shakhty.
4. In carrying out the coal shipping plan and in order to improve utilization of the trucks, and in carrying out the loading and unloading operations, all orders from the chiefs of the combines for the regiment commander and his representatives as well as for the battalion commander are to be carried out unquestioningly.
5. Deputy Peoples' Commissar of the Coal Industry, Comrade Savchenko, is charged with the responsibility of representing the chiefs of the combines in coal shipping negotiations.

The Peoples' Commissar for Coal

Signed: Vakhrushev

Chief of the Chief Directorate for
Motorized Troops of the Red Army

Signed: Lt. Gen. Tyagunov

(179) B. Coal Production

Messages were also intercepted indicating that not only the difficult transportation situation but also low production of coal contributed to the poor coal supply picture. For example, Mine #7 of the "Rostov-Ugol" Combine produced 100 tons of coal per day in October less than in September. Mine #20 in the first 8 days of October was 840 tons behind schedule. At the Coal Trust in Rostov, as well as at the mines in Novoshakhtinsk of the "Rostov-Ugol" Combine daily extraction dropped from 120 tons to 96 tons.

(180) The following message refers to the coal production situation:

"From Moscow to Gundorovka, Rostov Oblast', "Gundorov-Ugol", to Kudrin and Sinitsin.

"In November the Trust operated very poorly. For 21 days the daily plan was fulfilled by only 75.6%. The contract for making miners available has not been fulfilled. 230 too few men have been made available. For this reason, coal deliveries to the foundries of the South and to the railroads are endangered. I order you to take immediate steps to fulfill the November plan. Give the mines detailed operational contracts. I remind you that you are charged with personal responsibility for carrying out the coal extraction plan in November. Report measures taken.

Signed: Vakhrushev "

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General Supply

October:

(181) Supply was especially strained. Many branches of the economy had been very poorly supplied, above all, the Food Industry.

(182) The mills in Millerovo and Tarasovka had to cease operations because of the lack of coal.

(183) The preserves factory in Simferopol received only 600 tons of coal instead of the 800 tons needed.

(184) The Bread Combine in Taganrog was suffering great difficulties as a result of the coal shortage.

(185) In the generating stations in Kamenskaya, Shakhty, and Rostov, there was no coal.

(186) At the "Andreev" Plant the blast furnaces and the turbo-generator were operating only sporadically because of the coal shortage.

(187) The Plant "Krasnyj Kotelshchik" in Taganrog had no supplies of coal. The chemical plant in Kirovakan was to consume only 1,350 tons of coal in October. Any consumption in excess of that amount was prohibited.

(188) The leather factory in Taganrog had ceased operations because of a lack of coal. At the Don Steamship Agency considerable difficulties had arisen--5,000 tons of coal were required there immediately.

November:

(189) In Dnepropetrovsk the Meat Combine had to cease operations as a result of the coal shortage.

(190) In Dzaudzhikau the brewery had to cease operations because of the same reason and in Millerovo, local mills also had to cease operations.

(191) In Voronezh Oblast' there was no coal for blacksmiths. Repairs on tractors and agricultural equipment had to be halted.

(192) A plant of "Trubostal" in Taganrog and a plant of "Glavtrubostal" in the Donbas received only 372 tons and 330 tons of coal respectively instead of the 2,000 tons and 2,500 tons respectively required.

(193) The Plant "Instrument" of the NK for Munitions in Taganrog had to halt operations completely at the middle of November because of a lack of coal.

(194) The Plant of the NK for the Heavy Machine Industry in Lyudinovo was to receive 380 tons of coal in November. By 27 November Stalino-Ugol had not shipped anything.

(195) Plant 221 of the NK for Armaments was to receive 500 tons of coal from Shakhty "Rostov-Ugol" in November. By 26 November only 60 tons had arrived.

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(196) The North Caucasian Hospital Administration had to halt heating of hospitals because of the coal shortage.

December:

(197) The Trust "Rosglavkhleb" in Voronezh reported that the production of bread as well as the supplying of units of the Red Army had to be halted because of the lack of coal.

(198) At the Food Institute in Poltava neither courses in instruction nor laboratory work could be carried on because of the lack of coal.

(199) The administration of the Fat Combine in Rostov/Don had not received any coal for two months. Operations had to be halted at soap and lard factories.

(200) The Plant of "Grom" in Kharkov could not manufacture products important to the war effort because of the lack of coal.

(201) Plant 81 of the NK for Munitions in Taganrog had received only 40 tons of coal in the first 3 days of December instead of the 4,200 tons required.

(202) In a message to the Central Committee of the Party in Moscow, the Rolling Department at a plant in Makeevka had to cease operations at the end of November and the beginning of December because of the lack of heating material. From 1 through 11 December, 9,000 tons of coal were to be delivered. However, only 2,311 tons arrived.

(203) In the first 10-day period of December the chemical plant in Konstantinovka was to receive 800 tons of coal. In the first 4 days, however, only 128 tons arrived.

(204) Coal of low quality was delivered so that "Dontranstop" refused acceptance of coal with a high ash content from a number of mines of the "Rostov-Ugol" Combine for the use of the railroads. On 1 December coal stocks were on hand at the mines of the combine as follows:

<u>Mine</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Ash Content</u>
Mine 47	6,730 tons	37.5%
" 31	6,978	33.5
" (?) "Popovka"	3,858	41.
" 9 "Tatsinskaya"	2,642	46.
" "Severnaya"	373	28.

5. Oil Supply

(205) Oil supply in the Soviet Union is not a problem of oil extraction, but a pronounced transportation problem. Oil extraction generally seems to be sufficient. At any rate, there are sufficient stocks of oil on hand to protect the Soviet Union against any shortage. The technical side of the extraction, in contrast to that of coal production, seems to be satisfactory. During the last 2 years, technical shortages were noted relatively rarely in domestic radio traffic. All the difficulties which arose in this period were transportation

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difficulties. The seriousness and extent to which they affected all branches of the economy will be repeated again in this report.

(206) A. Effect of Transportation Difficulties in Oil Supply

On 27 November the following message was intercepted:

"From Makhachkala, 5 copies to (1) Moscow Chief Directorate for Oil Supply, Vovchenko

(2) USGKA (Lubrication and Fuel Directorate of the Red Army),
Kormilitsin

(3) Voenmortop (Naval Fuel Directorate?)

(4) of the Party, Golikov

(5) NK for Transportation, Langukhin

"As a result of poor procurement of tank cars the November transportation plan for oil products was carried out very unsatisfactorily. As of 25 November the monthly plan for railroad transportation was fulfilled by only 32 percent. Delivery obligations were fulfilled as follows:

"For the NK for:

Defense	47%
Navy	20
Agriculture	55
Transportation	27

"The percentage of fulfillment of lubricant deliveries was especially low. As a result of poor plan fulfillment on the part of railway transportation, further deliveries from Baku could not be accepted in Makhachkala because the storage capacity at the latter city was completely jammed.

"The Azerbajdzhan Oil Supply Office and "Kasptanker" sent cargoes to Makhachkala although they knew that the tankers would have a long storage time in Makhachkala. They do it in order to fulfill their monthly plans. In Makhachkala, as early as November, a very serious situation has arisen even though the harbor of Astrakhan has not yet been closed by ice. I urgently request assistance.

"First of all regular delivery of tank cars must be arranged; secondly, shipping on the waterways from Baku must be regulated.

Signed: Kashlaev "

(207) Especially remarkable is the statement that as a result of poor plan fulfillment of railway shipments, no further deliveries could be accepted from Baku in Makhachkala, because storage capacity there was jammed.

(208) In December also many similar messages were intercepted. For example, during the first ten days of December, instead of 2,000 tank cars

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of avtol and industrial oils, only 150 were filled by the Oil Supply Office in Makhachkala. This amounted to only about 7.5 percent of the plan. Shipment of winter lubricants for the NK for Transportation in the same period had been carried out considerably better, but nevertheless the plan was fulfilled by only 81 percent. This low shipping plan fulfillment was as a result of a poor delivery of empty tank cars and a lack of manpower.

(209) According to a message from the NK for the Tank Industry, "Neftesab" in Groznyj was ordered by a government decree to deliver the following to plants of the NK for the Tank Industry:

13,950 tons of mazut
6 tank cars of aircraft gasoline
14 tank cars of motor gasoline

Of this 7,150 tons of mazut and 3 tank cars of motor gasoline were delivered. Because of non-fulfillment of this government contract a very serious situation arose at the plants.

(210) At the oil supply center in Krasnovodsk also, the transportation situation was no better. Diesel oil delivery obligations could not be met.

B. Plan Fulfillment

(211) In spite of this especially serious situation, messages were intercepted according to which plans were even over-fulfilled. For example, in June the following quantities of oil products, which amounted to 120% of the plan arrived in Krasnovodsk:

Motor oil	4,902 tons
Summer mazut	12,902
Petroleum	17,985
Gasoline for Special Purposes	6,333
Ligroin	5,246
Diesel oil	6,172
Solar oil	206
Avtol	3,562
"	6,405
Nigrol	1,104
Spindel oil	3,279
Machine oil	1,986
Turbine oil	1,020
	<u>71,102 tons</u>

(212) On 23 November oil stocks of 114,000 tons were reported.

(213) In October the Oil Supply Office in Makhachkala fulfilled its delivery plan for oil products by 221%. Deliveries were as follows:

86,000 tons oil products "1"
45,000 tons "Ambarnaya" oil
948,000 tons (?) "Artemovskaya" oil

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C. Pumping Capacity of the Oil Lines

(214) The following table presents information on the capacity of the pump lines:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Line Makhachkala--Groznyj</u>	<u>Line Groznyj--Armavir</u>
17 Aug.	1 (?) 177 tons	2,307 tons
25 "	2,318	2,219
11 Sep.	1,200	
21 "	1,144	
23 "	2,232	4,308
2 Oct.	2,181	
6 "	2,135	956
7 Nov.		2,072
8 "		1,959
20 "	2,145	1,650
16 Dec.	2,065	

(215) In spite of these relatively large amounts delivered, complaints were often registered on unsatisfactory fulfillment of pumping plans. This was partially because of the shortage of pump motors and also partially a result of the shortage of workers or poor shipping conditions, because necessary amounts of oil could not be readily brought to their destinations. Reports were also intercepted concerning the pipeline Dzhamard (not located) and Krasnovodsk. It was to be put in operation on 1 July with a pumping capacity by 1 September of a total of 763,934 tons. That would be a daily pumping capacity of about 12,320 tons.

D. Oil Prospecting

(216) In the second half year of 1944 an intensive oil prospecting program was instituted, according to which the Azerbajdzhan Oil Industry received the following assignment in a message of 4 August:

1. To intensify geological exploration,
2. To put in operation inoperative borings.

(217) According to a radio report, oil prospecting was undertaken in the Caspian Sea with the aid of artificial earthquakes produced by underground explosions.

E. General Supply Situation

July:

(218) At the beginning of July a large number of orders to individual oil supply centers was placed by the sovkhoses and Machine and Tractor Stations of the Ukrainian Republic. These large amounts of oil were required for harvest and autumn procurement operations in the third quarter of 1944. They were as follows:

174,000	tons petroleum
25,000	ligroin
4,000	diesel fuel
16,000	gasoline
12,000	motor oil

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(219) Since in May the Ukraine had received 35,000 tons of petroleum less than had been planned in the second quarter, a considerable part of the tractors had to halt operations. As a result, Machine Tractor Stations and sovkhoses would not have had sufficient stocks of oil for the harvest operations even assuming complete delivery of the June plan. In order to assure smooth carrying out of harvest operations it was necessary to increase intake of oil for the Ukraine particularly in the first half of the month. The Ukraine Republic was to be allotted in the third quarter therefore the following:

- 1)

157,000 tons Petroleum
12,000 Ligroin
3,000 Diesel fuel
10,000 Gasoline
10,000 Motor oil

The following allotment of lubricants was unconditionally ordered for generators, tractors and threshers, as well as for other agricultural machinery:

1,300 tons of avtol
160 of solidol
110 of nigrol
325 of machine oil

- 2) The following were required by the Ukrainian NK for Sovkhoses:

12,000 tons Petroleum
6,000 Ligroin
4,000 Gasoline

- 3) Fulfillment of the oil delivery plans for agriculture was to be carried out with delivery of the following (in tank cars):

6,000 tank cars of petroleum
600 " " " ligroin
150 tons diesel oil
300 motor oil
600 avtol
120 nigrol
40 solidol

(220) At least 60 percent of the shipments were to be made in the first half of June.

(221) In the various branches of the economy a serious shortage of oil products was noted. A cross-section of July messages gives the following picture:

As a result of the gasoline shortage, large quantities of threshers and trucks in Groznyj Oblast' were immobilized. Ashkhabad reported the following on 21 July:

1. The brewery in Ashkhabad had to cease production of carbonic acid as a result of the mazut shortage.

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2. As a result of the gasoline shortage "Yagmani-Ugol" could not ship any additional coal.
3. Gathering in the grapes began on 1 August. The Food Industry in Ashkhabad required 200 tons of mazut and 10 tons of gasoline for transportation purposes as otherwise it would be impossible to collect the grapes.

(222) In Labinskaya the dairy had to cease operations because of a lack of solar oil.

(223) The macaroni factory in Groznyj had to cease operations because of the lack of mazut.

(224) At many ball-bearing plants, as for example at Sverdlovsk, Tomsk, and Kujbyshev, a serious shortage of lubricants was noted.

August:

(225) In August, on the basis of an order from the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the Union from the Council of the NK of Azerbajdzhan, the trucks of the following officials and enterprises were seized as an economy measure:

Chairman of the NK for Communications
Chief Directorate of Railway Transportation
Caucasian Power Plant Construction Directorate
NK for Local Industry
State Construction Trust of Azerbajdzhan
Baku Port Directorate
Aluminum Plant
NK for Fisheries
NK for Kolkhozes
Caspian Steamship Agency

(226) As a result of the reduction in the gasoline allotment after the requisitioning of their trucks, enterprises subordinate to the Council of the NK of Azerbajdzhan as well as those subordinate to the Union in Azerbajdzhan had to cease transportation activity.

(227) The NK for Agriculture in Azerbajdzhan was to receive 200 tons of gasoline for the third quarter; according to a report from 26 July only 26 tons remained on hand for August. There was also a lack of ligroin so that a large number of threshers had to be immobilized.

(228) At the Azerbajdzhan NK for Trade the minimum requirement of the Republic was reduced from 4,000 tons of petroleum to 2,000 tons. Enterprises of the NK for Coal were to receive 81 tank cars of industrial oil as follows:

3	tank cars of spindel oil
5	motor oil
20	cylinder oil 2
2	turbine oil
6	cylinder oil 6
3	viscosin
16	transformer oil
10	nigrol
<u>16</u>	compressor oil

TOTAL: 81 tank cars

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(229) In 20 days of August 64 tank cars were shipped as follows:

3	tank cars Spindel oil
5	Motor oil
20	Cylinder oil 2
2	Turbine oil
6	Cylinder oil 6
3	Viscosin
17	Transformer oil
<u>8</u>	Nigrol

TOTAL: 64 tank cars

(230) At the "Ferro" Plant in Zestafoni there was likewise a lack of gasoline.

(231) In Kiev Oblast¹ there was an extraordinarily serious shortage of gasoline.

(232) In Voronezh Oblast¹ reconstruction operations had to be suspended because of the lack of transformer oil.

September:

(233) In general, the total picture is not greatly changed compared to the previous month.

(234) In the grain transportation situation, as has already been mentioned in this report in the chapter entitled Agriculture and Food Situation, the fuel shortage was especially serious.

(235) In Ordzhonikidze Kraj a truck battalion arrived to carry out grain shipments. To meet a need of 525 tons of gasoline, only 24 tons were authorized.

(236) The Oil Supply Office in Makhachkala was to ship 484 tank cars of ligroin for enterprises of the NK for Agriculture. As of 18 July not a single tank car had yet been shipped and even the necessary amount for the above-mentioned enterprises had not yet arrived from Baku.

(237) Enterprises of the NK for the Food Industry, as has been mentioned in all previous reports, were especially poorly supplied. Thus, the bread factory in Kizil Arvat had not received any mazut for 2 months. They were forced to cease operations and there was no supply of bread for the civilian population.

(238) In Ordzhonikidze a large number of plants of the NK for the Food Industry had ceased operations because of the mazut shortage. Meat combines of the NK for Procurement in Baku suspended work for the same reason.

(239) In Dzardzhikau the preserves factory could produce no dried vegetables because of a shortage of mazut and gasoline.

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(240) The following plants suspended operations because of the shortage of heating material:

Alcohol Factory of Ossetia	on 31 August
"	" in Kotlyarevskaya on 2 September
"	" in Ordzhonikidze on 11 September

(241) In order to assure fulfillment of government contracts and to safeguard from loss the already seriously endangered stocks of raw materials, the following were contracted for:

For the Alcohol Factory in Kotlyarevskaya	250 tons of mazut
" " " " " Ossetia	250 " " "
" " " " " Ordzhonikidze	250 " " "
" " " " " Pervenets	350 " " "
" " " " " Groznyj	200 " " "

(242) The Foundry in Zestafoni also had no gasoline in September. In Batajsk 200 tank cars of petroleum were to arrive during the month. By 23 September only 32 tank cars had arrived. Agricultural operations had to be suspended.

(243) The Steam Power Plant of Plant 182 of the NK for Shipbuilding in Makhachkala was supplying the following enterprises with electrical current:

Plant #182
Industry of the Oil Trust in Dagestan
Weaving Mill of the NK for Light Industry
The Oil Transshipment and Storage Base and Port
The Ship Machine Factory of the NK for the Merchant Fleet
The Railway Directorate at Makhachkala
Ship Repair Workshops of the Caspian Fleet
Enterprises of the Fishing Trust of Dagestan
Industrial Cooperatives
Oblast' Directorate Offices, etc.

(244) For production of electric current the Steam Power Plant required 3,800 tons of mazut monthly. For July of 1944 the following contributed mazut allocations to the power plant:

The NK for Shipbuilding	1,400 tons
The NK for the Oil Industry in Dagestan	1,000

The other enterprises mentioned above received no authorizations for mazut and thus were forced with a shut down in operations because the steam power plant could not deliver any electric current to them. The Oblast' Party Committee of Makhachkala requested a supplementary authorization of 1,400 tons of heating mazut.

October:

(245) In October a similar picture was presented. In the Food Industry, combines, bread factories, alcohol factories, etc. were inoperative primarily because of a lack of mazut.

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(246) At the Tractor Plant in Stalingrad no tractors could be produced because of a lack of motor and aviation gasoline.

(247) The Martin furnaces at the foundry in Krasnyj Sulin had to be shut down because of a lack of mazut.

(248) At individual plants of the NK for the Chemical Industry production of items important to the war effort had to be stopped because of unsatisfactory delivery of white alcohol.

November:

(249) In Ukrainian Oblast' agricultural work had to be halted because of a lack of petroleum.

(250) In Ashkhabad no grain could be shipped. In Dzardzhikau, Baku and Makhachkala mills had to cease operation as did agricultural enterprises.

(251) At the canneries in Adygejsk, Ejsk, Khatulajsk and Sochi shortages of mazut caused interruptions in production.

(252) Supplies to the electrical generating stations were especially poor. "Azenergo" required 53,950 tons of heating mazut in November. Only 46,870 tons were authorized.

(253) In Makhachkala, enterprises, educational institutes and dwellings in the city were without electric current because of the mazut shortage.

(254) The electrical generating station in Tbilisi received from Batumi only 2,875 tons of coal instead of the 8,000 tons required and from Baku only 710 tons instead of the 2,000 tons required.

(255) Moreover, in Tbilisi all leather plants, large sewing establishments, and other enterprises of the NK for Light Industry ceased operations on 22 November for the same reason.

(256) The following message confirms the assumption that not only transportation difficulties but also poor organization in the shipments produced the critical oil supply situation in the Soviet Union:

From Stalingrad.. 2 copies: (1) Moscow, the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the Union, Comrade Beriya, (2) the Peoples' Commissar for Ferrous Metals, Comrade Tevosyan.

"The Chief Directorate for Oil Supply has not carried out order number 63580 of the State Committee for Defense. By 1 December the Plant "Krasnyj Oktyabr" was to receive 20,000 tons of mazut by water. This delivery has not been made. As a result, the plant has no winter stocks whatsoever and shortly must cease operations. Mazut stocks are sufficient for only the next two days. Rail shipments of mazut expected from Groznyj will in no way satisfy requirements. Moreover, because of low steam production in the plant the tank cars of mazut arriving from Groznyj can only be warmed up if all other shops cease operations. This would lead to complete disorganization

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of the enterprise. In connection with the cessation of shipping on the Volga, "Volgatanker" has anchored at the plant's anchorage the tow barge "Don" with 5,600 tons of mazut (primary distillation), the tow barge "Chulym" with 8,000 tons of mazut (partially primary distillation), and a tow barge loaded with ligroin. I request, therefore, that in view of the especially serious situation at the plant and in consideration of the urgency of individual contracts, particularly of contracts No. 7 and 2, the mazut in the tow barges "Don" and "Chulym" in our anchorage be transferred to us. I should like to note that the mazut could not be used under any circumstances until the beginning of 1945. I request your assistance.

Signed: Matevosyan. "

December:

(257) In Ordzhonikidze Kraj there was neither ligroin nor gasoline for transport of grain.

(258) For agricultural requirements only 32 tank cars of oil product No. 10 was authorized instead of the 100 tank cars required.

(259) The preserves factory in Ordzhonikidze was forced to cease operations on 1 December because of the lack of mazut.

(260) Plants Nos. 573, 248, and 604 of the NK for Munitions were in an extraordinarily difficult situation because of a lack of oil.

(261) At "Aztekhsnabneft" in Baku new compressor equipment could not be put into operation because of a lack of cylinder oil.

(262) The Azerbajdzhan Peoples' Commissar for Light Industry, Magiev, complained to his superior office in Moscow about the insufficient delivery of mazut during the fourth quarter. In the fourth quarter 3,000 tons of mazut shipments behind schedule were authorized to be made up. These shipments could not be made, however, because insufficient stocks were available. A request for delivery of the same amount of mazut was refused. For the fourth quarter at least 3,000 tons of heating mazut were required. Disruption of operations throughout the entire Textile Industry threatened.

(263) An emergency message from the Caspian Fleet:

"Ships of the Caspian Fleet have been frozen in at Krasnovodsk Harbor. The lack of an allotment of fuel from Baku is especially detrimental. Shipments of heating material from Groznyj will be considerably delayed because of stormy weather near Makhachkala. The heating mazut shipped from Groznyj will have a very high viscosity because of the cold weather and ice conditions and aboard the ships will be useless as a heating material unless first warmed. In order to bring the ships into ice-free water an allotment of 1,000 tons of heating mazut is required for the Caspian Fleet. Non-authorization of this required quantity of heating mazut could result in destruction of the ships. Requests to the NK for the Merchant Fleet have been fruitless to date."

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(264) At the Azerbajdzhan Oil Combine also a serious shortage of diesel oil was felt in December. As a result of the expansion of technical tasks an additional delivery of 1,000 tons of diesel oil was required.

F. Statistics:

(265) The following table presents information on the individual deliveries, authorizations and requirements and their quantitative breakdown by individual oil supply office. In order to eliminate duplication in the following tables, deliveries from the Oil Supply Offices at Baku and Groznyj to other oil supply offices have not been included. Only shipments from the individual oil supply offices to consumers are included. The following deliveries, authorizations and requirements have been established:

<u>Month</u>	<u>Requirements</u>	<u>Authorizations</u>	<u>Deliveries</u>
July	2,053 tons	12,369 tons	46,185 tons
August	4,355	6,658	60,868
September	170	19,263	14,798
October	22,729	37,139	60,687
November	11,831	69,490	24,978
December	6,078	75,229	60,066
	<u>47,216</u>	<u>220,148</u>	<u>267,582</u>

(266) Breakdown by individual oil supply offices:

<u>Oil Supply Office:</u>	<u>Requirements</u>	<u>Authorizations</u>	<u>Deliveries</u>
Baku	26,419 tons	67,519 tons	100,262 tons
Batumi	-	9,404	4,991
Groznyj	10,733	77,587	100,105
Krasnodar	900	17,092	503
Krasnovodsk	2,343	4,826	11,960
Makhachkala	1,533	13,831	28,015
Rostov Don	29	2,179	2,300
Other Suppliers	5,259	27,660	19,446
	<u>47,216</u>	<u>220,148</u>	<u>267,582</u>

(267) Individual fuels and lubricants as well as other oil products are divided into requirements, authorizations and deliveries for the entire half year as follows:

<u>Fuel and Lubricant</u>	<u>Requirement</u>	<u>Authorization</u>	<u>Delivery</u>
Oil products (unidentified)	1,319 tons	3,523 tons	3,765 tons
Mazut	34,177	144,638	207,513
Diesel fuel	4,154	11,909	6,890
Petroleum	1,536	8,639	5,302
Gasoline	1,494	17,950	8,420
Benzol	-	-	2,737
Ligroin	155	6,571	5,496
Motor oil	185	1,744	1,778

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<u>Fuel and Lubricant</u>	<u>Requirement</u>	<u>Authorization</u>	<u>Delivery</u>
White alcohol	1,130 tons	640 tons	149 tons
Motor oil	-	772	1,828
Spindle oil	24	877	1,119
Machine oil	-	2,474	785
Solar oil	46	1,427	467
Cylinder oil	30	560	252
Viscosin	-	130	40
Turbine oil	1	620	91
Avtol	5	857	3,146
Compressor oil	-	160	20
Green oil	-	36	-
Nigrol	10	20	60
Aviation oil	-	12	53
Lubrication oil	48	84	6,638
Lubrication mazut	-	726	740
Xylol	-	-	65
Solidol	12	192	5
Assidol	-	30	-
Oil product No. 6	-	60	-
" " 9	-	20	-
" " 10	1,700	2,188	1,804
" " 12	400	2,860	44
" " 14	-	90	80
" " 15 (?)	100	-	-
" " 18	480	270	105
" " 21	-	860	-
" " 23	-	890	-
" " 27	-	-	16
" " 29	200	1,643	3,456
" " 70	-	3,000	3,994
" " 100	-	40	-
Paraffin	-	2,320	-
Transformer oil	10	1,286	699
Tar oil	-	30	25
	<u>47,216</u>	<u>220,148</u>	<u>267,582</u>

NOTE: The unusual relationship between requirements, authorizations, and deliveries is explained by the fact that generally only messages concerning additional requirements were intercepted.

6. Auxiliary Deliveries from the Western Powers to the Soviet Union via Iran

(268) The most important data concerning the execution of deliveries from the West to the Soviet Union via Iran is included in Appendix No. 2 to "Military-Economic Report" 2/8 of 16 August 1944.

(269) During the second half year no changes or additional information on this subject could be determined.

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A. Transshipment at certain points

(270) According to messages concerning individual deliveries via Iran during the second half year, the following data is presented and compared with the first half year:

Transshipment Point	1st Half Year 1944	2nd Half Year 1944	Percent above or below First Half Year
Baku	69,300 tons	56,966 tons	- 17.8%
Makhachkala	40,100	57,138	+ 42.5
Krasnovodsk	28,600	37,103	+ 29.7
Dzhulfa	19,990	5,326	- 73.2
Astara (?)	19,440	4,336	- 77.7
Ashkhabad	11,800	2,961	- 74.9
Batumi	-	11,472	
Astrakhan	-	6,183	
Tbilisi	3,100	2,353	- 24.1
Erevan	2,300	18	- 99.2
Ordzhonikidze	1,400	2,685	+ 91.8
Leninakan	1,100	3,875	+ 25.2
Other cities	4,500	2,596	- 42.3
	201,500 tons	193,012 tons	- 4.2%

(271) As seen in the above table the total tonnage of imports in the second half year of 1944 remained approximately the same as in the first half year.

(272) Exactly as in the first half year, in the second transport conditions were especially poor for regular distribution of imported goods. The following message gives a clear picture of conditions which prevailed for a long time in Baku Harbor:

Baku, to the Chief of the Transcaucasus Railroad in Tbilisi and to the NK for Foreign Trade in Moscow on 16 September: From 1 through 15 September only 438 railroad cars were furnished instead of 920. From 10 to 15 September no railroad cars were provided with the exception of 4 refrigerator cars. Transportation of goods by shuttle train between Baku and Astrakhan has not yet been organized. Warehouses and other enclosed storage points are jammed with cargo. Preserves, sugar and military cargoes have been of necessity stored in the open. Preservation of cargoes such as sugar, milk, dried eggs, fabric, etc. in an undamaged condition cannot be guaranteed by only covering them with tarpaulins as the rainy season has now begun. Railroad cars have not been provided and the fulfillment of the September plan for shipping imported goods cannot be assured. Assistance is requested. Cargoes are piling up in Baku Harbor because the economic organizations do not promptly appoint recipients. They should be directed to issue well before the first of the month the distribution plan for all import cargoes from Iranian ports.

(273) Another message describes the same situation in December:

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During the last three months there has been a deficiency of 13,036 railroad cars provided by the Railway Directorate in Tbilisi for transportation of imported cargoes. In Baku Harbor large quantities of chemicals, foods and industrial cargoes have accumulated which are stored in the open and are in particular danger of being lost. With the beginning of the period of poor weather it is beginning to rain in Baku. The situation is regarded as catastrophic. In order to avoid loss of the valuable chemicals and foods, expedited delivery of covered railroad cars is urgently required.

B. Total turnover by month

(274) In the individual months there was reported the following turnover of imported cargoes:

July	30,301 tons
August	20,636
September	78,756
October	23,315
November	20,108
December	19,896
	<u>193,012 tons</u>

(275) At this point "Military Economic Report" 2/8 of 16 August 1944 mentioned above must again be referred to. At that time a comparison of radio messages concerning delivery of railroad cars for imported goods with messages intercepted concerning shipments for a definite period of time indicated that reports on one quarter to one fifth of the actual total deliveries were intercepted. This assumption was confirmed by other information: for instance, from the total shipping space required by the Caspian Steamship Agency. Deliveries in intercepted traffic for the month of September at Baku amounted to about 14,177 tons. According to a message at the beginning of September, the September import plan for Baku was increased by 75,000 tons. The plan total is not known. We may assume, however, that it was fulfilled by about 2/3. This would give support to the above assumption that messages on one quarter to one fifth of total deliveries are intercepted. We may thus estimate total imports via Iran in the second half year of 1944 at about one million tons and in the entire year at about 2 million tons. According to radio reports, about one quarter of all assistance rendered by the West is routed via Iran. The total quantity of goods delivered from the West during 1944, therefore, would be about 8 to 10 million tons.

C. Details of Imports:

(276) Large quantities of foods, metals and metal products, chemicals, textiles, leather and oil products were imported. The following tables represent a quantitative breakdown of these categories by month from intercepted traffic:

Month	Food	Metals	Chemicals	Leather
July	24,141 tons	6,027 tons	16 tons	24 tons
August	2,801	2,028	712	352
September	50,389	11,299	-	192
October	13,941	5,402	736	250
November	1,539	2,762	20	-
December	8,520	5,055	35	-
	<u>101,331 tons</u>	<u>32,573 tons</u>	<u>1,519 tons</u>	<u>818 tons</u>

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Month	Textiles	Oil	Other	No Specified
July	- tons	- tons	93 tons	- tons
August	1,049	264	1,471	11,959
September	258	-	254	16,364
October	334	416	2,236	-
November	228	-	579	14,980
December	4,508	376	338	1,064
	6,377 tons	1,056 tons	4,971 tons	44,367 tons

(277) Imports not specified by weightMetal Products

7 Machine Tools
13 Transformers
6,850 sets of automobile tires
8,000 meters of steel cable
1 drum of cable
10 electric motors

Leather

10,000 pairs military shoes
20,165 pairs shoes

Alcohol

30,000 liters vodka
10,000 liters alcohol

Textiles

26,000 meters uniform material
160,000 yards material
150,000 meters gabardine
7,000 meters cotton material
14,000 meters khaki
13,700 meters special khaki
11,000 meters woven cotton fabric
11,000 rolls yarn
30,280 shirts
330,810 stockings
50,000 rolls of yarn, each of 2,000 yards
102,000 meters tarpaulin
497,000 sacks
100,000 yards sack linen
10,000 meters material

Miscellaneous

_____, 000 uniform buttons
16,000 stocking clasps
700 containers of meat and vegetable preserves.

(278) Percentage breakdown of imported goods by tonnage:

	2nd Half Year 1944	(For comparison) 1st Half Year - 1944
Foods	51.4%	51.0%
Metals	17.1	27.3
Chemicals	0.8	7.6
Leather	0.4	1.0
Textiles	3.3	0.4
Oil	0.5	0.2
Other	2.5	2.8
Not specified	23.0	9.7
	100.0%	100.0%

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(279) Tonnage and percentage breakdown of food, metal and chemical imports are given in the following tables:

<u>Foods:</u>	2nd Half Year 1944	(For comparison) 1st Half Year - 1944
Flour	266 tons	0.2%
Preserved meat	22,899	22.5
Rice	10,724	10.6
Sugar	22,472	22.2
Fat	3,793	3.8
Leguminous Plants	378	0.5
Other	16,519	16.4
Unspecified food cargoes	24,280	23.8
	101,331 tons	100.0%
<u>Ferrous Metals:</u>		
Steel	5,562 tons	17.3%
Steel sheet	1,801	5.5
Steel wire	82	0.3
Steel strip	782	2.4
Iron sheet	3,543	10.8
Tubing	1,259	3.9
Iron wire	441	1.3
Nails	180	0.5
Railroad material	11,027	34.2
Other	167	0.5
	24,928 tons	76.7%
<u>Nonferrous metals:</u>		
Tungsten	420 tons	1.3%
Copper	1,045	3.2
Copper wire	68	0.2
Rolled metals	4,000	12.2
White metal	42	0.1
Zinc	280	0.9
Zinc sheets	365	0.1
Cable	1,425	4.3
	7,645 tons	23.3%
Ferrous metals	24,828	76.7
	32,573 tons	100.0%
<u>Chemicals:</u>		
Potash	30 tons	1.9%
Acetone	28	1.8
Phenol	45	2.9
Caustic Soda	1,011	66.4
Koloksilin	305	20.1
Camphor	16	1.2
Sulfate	12	0.8
Casein	14	0.9
Ferrosilicium	20	1.4
Phosphor-Catalyst	8	0.5
Glycerine	20	1.4
Ammonium sulfate	10	0.7
	1,519 tons	100.0%

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(280) An analysis of the imports clearly indicates certain deficiencies in the supply picture in the Soviet economy. Especially remarkable is the fact that Russia, in its own right a land rich in oil, imports oil products. These imports are probably high quality lubrication oil and high quality gasoline, as several messages indicated that foreign motive equipment, electric motors and other machines could not be serviced with Soviet oil products. The principal food items imported are sugar and preserved meat.

(281) The need for metal products is apparent from the following message:

Baku reports on 5 July that in the storehouses of the Industrial Raw Material Import Office there were shortages of tubes, girders and electric welding wire. They are needed by the NK's for Water Transport and Agriculture. There were absolutely no steel alloys on hand. There is an urgent need for rolled steel, profile steel, steel sheeting, carbon-containing steel, boiler plate, black and white sheeting, as well as special steel for agricultural purposes.

(282) The import of explosives noted in the previous half year was completely lacking in this half year.

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7. Bolshevization of Estonia

(283) In the period from 1 November through 31 December messages were intercepted which bore the character of domestic radio traffic but which were handled over a former guerrilla network. These messages concerned the Bolshevization of Estonia. They were all signed by a certain KAROTAMM, who before the war played an important role in the Communist Party in Estonia and later, in the years 1943 and 1944, was a major general in charge of the direction of Estonian guerrilla bands. His principal assignment is to make Estonia as adaptable as possible to Communism and according to intercepted traffic this consisted of (1) Bolshevization of the country and (2) plundering the Estonian economy.

(284) Carrying out these two tasks together met great difficulties because Communization presupposes an at least tolerant attitude on the part of the majority of the Estonian population. This was made extremely difficult by the economic stripping of the land. Karotamm had no chance to deceive the Estonian people for any great length of time on the consequences of Communization. In detail, the following was determined:

1. Political penetration of the cities and countryside

(285) The Estonian Press was immediately taken over by the Communist Party. Its principal task was to kindle an artificial hate against the "Hitler Fascists". To support this campaign in the press the following methods were used:

1. Political lectures consisting, among other things, of extensive playup of German atrocities;
2. Establishment of special commissions to uncover and summarize all war damage as well as atrocities which could be charged to the German conduct of the war;
3. Measures such as the leveling of German military graves and the establishment of "Heroes' Peace Homes" for members of the Red Army and the Estonian resistance movement.

(286) There was then an attempt to influence the attitude of the population by Soviet victory reports and prophecies of future conduct of the war. The heroism of the Red Army was emphasized as was the might of the Red Artillery. In all cities and towns flags were displayed, meetings were held and resolutions made.

(287) An especially noisy fanfare was made in the victory report on the capture of Sarema, achieving thereby the final "liberation" of Estonia.

(288) As an example one message will be repeated which is particularly indicative of all these methods:

Message of 22 November to the Secretaries of the Okrug and city committees. Organize in the next few days a series of meetings to consider the article on the burial of Fascist victims in Tartu. This article will be printed in the 25 November issue of the newspaper

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"Rachvateataya". Reprint this article, make short resolutions concerning it at the meetings and send them to us.

Whip up hate by the population for the Germans and their supporters, for the bourgeois nationalities, for traitors and hangmen, for those who disseminate provoking rumors, for those who terrorize the population on all sides, etc. Call on the people to exterminate the agents of the Germans and the enemies of the people. Pay particular attention to the question of verbal propaganda. All this will be helpful to you in carrying out an economic and political reorganization of the country. The land reform is to be completed especially rapidly in order to fulfill agricultural deliveries. Inform me immediately about the progress and results of the meetings.

Signed: Karotamm

(289) In connection with this "political reeducation", the political system and observance of individual persons were also organized as in Russia. Registration of the population was carried out. Citizens of cities and villages received identification cards which were issued for certain reasons but not further clarified.

(290) The method of Socialist competitions often used in Russia was also practiced here to a large extent. The following message serves as an example:

Message of 24 November
To the Secretaries of the Okrug and city committees

I suggest that in all undertakings competitions be organized following the example of the plant "Krasnyj Krul". The example of the workers in the "Krasnyj Krul" plant is printed in the 23 November issue of the newspapers. Prepare these actions well and carry them out. Send me the text of your directives for the republic press. Report what action has been taken on this question.

Signed: Karotamm

(291) Karotamm, who is himself an Estonian, lays particular stress that no national differences between Russia and Estonia might arise. This is shown by the selection of his immediate subordinates from the Estonian people as may be determined from the names of the personnel to whom and from whom messages are sent. Likewise, the local party organs were under no circumstances to be composed of Russians, but only of Estonians. Some of his orders to the secretaries of Okrug and city committees of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia concerning the carrying out of educational courses to train new political leaders and party workers follow:

Message of 17 December

Organize a 3-month course of instruction for the Soviet party co-workers and not for agricultural co-workers as was reported by you incorrectly. Recruit a total of 5 to 10 persons from the party organs (chairmen of the Oblast' Executive Committees, their deputies, the best members

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of the Agricultural Reconstruction Commission, workers in enterprises, workers on the Oblast' Executive Committees, etc.). The material may be obtained from the Central Committee through 22 December. I charge you with personal responsibility for fulfillment of this plan.

Signed: Karotamm

Message of 10 December

Not later than 15 December submit a report on the persons selected for the instruction courses for party functionaries according to the letter from the Department for Personnel Affairs of 24 November. In selecting them consider their political reliability, and their thoroughness at work. Fulfillment is to be reported.

Signed: Karotamm

(292) Personnel were also conscripted for NKVD schools. Karotamm ordered that shock troops be trained in all enterprises, cities, towns, branches of the economy, etc. The organization and working methods of these shock troops are given in the following message:

Message of 8 December to the secretaries of the Okrug Committees

In the next few days organize extensive meetings of party members and non-party members of the Okrug and of the city after the regular Oblast' Party meetings. Speakers for these two meetings will be provided by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia. Immediately after these meetings, carry out meetings of the workers in all villages, enterprises, etc., concerning current problems and our tasks. Detailed instructions for these meetings will be received from the Central Committee speakers. Submit a report as soon as possible.

Signed: Karotamm

Message of 15 November to Comrade Weinberg

I repeat the essence of telegram No. 1204 from Comrade Karotamm containing 313 word groups. The shock troops in the village population are to be trained in the Soviet spirit. Therefore, you are to analyze: my theme--"Velikij Prazdnik" /Great holiday/. Submit the material before the assigned deadline. You are personally charged with responsibility for fulfillment. Prepare yourself for participation in the joint meeting to discuss this matter. You will be informed of the date of the joint meeting.

Signed: Vesev

2. The land reform program

(293) Many messages indicated that an extensive land reform was underway. The extent to which this is a collectivization of Estonian peasantry has not yet been determined. At any rate, the removal of peasants sympathetic to the Germans or nationalist in sentiment will be carried out on a large scale.

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The following messages give some information on the land reform program:

Message of 15 December to the Secretary of the Okrug Committee

Until 1 January factory workers are not to be considered in the carrying out of land reforms and procurement operations. Instructions concerning the correct fulfillment of these operations do not include factory workers.

Signed: Karotamm

Message of 26 November to the Secretary of the Okrug Committee

1. Do not forget to provide recipients of land with cattle and other livestock. Do this simultaneously with the return of the land; politically this is extremely important.
2. Be especially observant that the law prohibiting the grinding of grain until complete fulfillment of the prescribed norms is adhered to.
3. With the exception of Walgamaa, results are poor and reports on the progress of the land reforms and the procurement operations have been sent irregularly. I demand that exact reports be sent.

Signed: Karotamm

Message of 27 November to the Secretary of the Okrug Committee

I demand that land be issued to those who do not possess it. The auxiliary farms are not to be divided among farmers. Auxiliary farms will be divided only by the NK for Agriculture and not by the Okrug Committees. The Okrugs may, however, submit proposals to the NK for Agriculture.

(294) A further message shows clearly the measures taken against peasants sympathetic to the Germans or nationalistically minded:

Message of 8 November to the secretaries of the Okrug Committees

By 15 December organize a renewed examination of the extent to which government deliveries have been fulfilled. Take measures against those who deliberately did not fulfill the requirements. Pay particular attention to farmers possessing large farms and to those sympathetic to the Germans.

Signed: Karotamm

(295) The two following messages give a further survey:

Message of 22 November to the secretaries of the Okrug Committees

Be especially careful that from the holdings of wealthy farmers good land, fields, meadows, etc. are split off for peasants who do not have

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any land or who have poor land, and that no poor land is thus handed over. Split land off from the holdings of supporters of the Germans with all severity. Do not permit misinterpretation of the law in favor of the enemy. It is necessary that the oblast' organs and commissions perform certain functions for the Soviet power as required in the Agrarian Law.

Signed: Karotamm

Message of 11 November to the secretaries of the Okrug Committees

Return of the land to the peasants is going very poorly. Devote all your energies to this operation. Do not wait for requests from the peasants. All peasants who received land in 1940 automatically receive this land back, if they were not agents of the Germans. Requests must be received from those wishing land who did not receive land in 1940. The commissions evaluating damage and atrocities are working unsatisfactorily. In the next few days we are sending a man to investigate this work. It will go badly for you if you do not take suitable measures.

Signed: Karotamm

(296) In true Soviet form, many motor tractor stations were set up and large "emergency deliveries" were made.

3. Agricultural Stripping of Estonia

(297) Simultaneously with the establishment of Communism in Estonia an intensive program to strip the land was carried out. For example large deliveries of potatoes were demanded:

Message of 19 November to Comrade Tamm

On the basis of a decision by the bureau of the Central Committee of the Party, you were to guarantee shipment of 450 tons of potatoes to Tallinn. On 15 November only 86 tons of potatoes had actually been shipped. The plan for preparations for potato shipments has been fulfilled by only 31%. Take immediate steps to carry out the plan for procurement and shipment of the potatoes to Tallinn. Report by telegraph the quantity of potatoes which are stored at locations near railroad stations.

Signed: Karotamm

(298) Apparatus was set up whereby whoever did not fulfill the delivery quota would be prevented from purchasing necessary consumer goods. The following message explains these methods:

Message of 27 November to Comrade Abori

I repeat: Horseshoes and nails may be purchased only by those who completely fulfilled government delivery quotas. The land reform in your sector is progressing very badly. Dispatch workers from the Okrug Committee, a representative of the Executive Committee and

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others into the individual oblasti and villages to help out. Visit the points yourself by air.

Signed: Karotamm

(299) Also the so-called "over delivery" line from "poor" peasants was carried into the field. The following message is considered a poor fabrication:

Message of 14 December to all secretaries of the Okrug Committees, the Party and the Authorities of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Communist Estonia.

On 14 December all newspapers published my telegram to the (land)-poor peasant Puussild in Parnumaa who delivered 80 times more than the government quota required. He also fulfilled all other delivery obligations. Execute in the local press a well-prepared and extensive article to the effect that that patriotic achievement should serve as an incentive for all working peasants. Utilize this as a basis for the most rapid possible fulfillment and overfulfillment of the plan for government delivery.

Signed: Karotamm

(300) Some percentage results of the planned deliveries of grain, potatoes, meat and milk up through 15 December (from the beginning of December for the December plan) have been intercepted in the following message:

Message of 17 December to the secretaries of the Okrug Committees of the Party and to the Authorities of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Communist Estonia.

According to previous information from the Okrug Committee, the plan for government deliveries of grain, potatoes, meat and milk through 15 December have been fulfilled as follows:

	<u>Grains</u>	<u>Potatoes</u>	<u>Meat</u>	<u>Milk</u>
Virumaa Okrug	74%	89%	73%	30%
Laanemaa Okrug	69	105	76	23
Saaremaa Okrug	53	88	50	3
Järvemaa Okrug	38	40	30	81
Hiiumaa (?) Okrug	37	58	143	64
Viljandimaa Okrug	32	74	79	66
Harjumaa Okrug	35	36	79	89
Pärnumaa Okrug	28	41	49	48
Tartumaa Okrug	22	49	66	49
Valgamaa Okrug	15	52	80	17

The picture is varied and shows poor fulfillment. Many okrugs are shamefully behind schedule and have delivered very little with respect to compliance with the conclusions adapted at the 5th meeting of the Central Committee of the Council of Peoples' Commissars. I charge you with the responsibility of taking definite measures in order to fulfill the government delivery plan completely by the first of January.

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An exception is permissible only here and there with respect to deliveries of milk.

Signed: Karotamm

(301) It was emphasized in every way that the deliveries must be fulfilled and if everything did not go smoothly the "saboteurs" would be punished.

(302) Exact reports were to be made almost daily on the progress of meat, potato and grain deliveries from the individual okrugs.

4. Resistance by the population

(303) The Estonian population reacted instinctively against lies such as mentioned above with respect to farmer Puussild and his 80-fold over-delivery. The following telegram presents information on this subject:

Message of 18 December to the secretaries of the Okrug Committees and the authorities of the Central Committee of Communist Estonia.

Report within 3 days what you have done to urge the peasants to emulate the patriotic achievement of Puussild. (See to it) that a mass movement arises to overfulfill food deliveries. Convince the peasants in every oblast that this must be done as quickly as possible. Immediately submit to us all usable facts so that we may print them in the press. Utilize these facts on the spot in order to spur on the other farmers.

Signed: Karotamm

(304) German counter-propaganda seems to have had a fairly strong effect, particularly in the rural areas. According to the two following messages Karotamm seems to have encountered great difficulties:

Message of 6 November to the secretaries of the Okrug Committees

The supporters and agents of the German occupiers are operating particularly in the villages; there they are trying to sabotage the land reforms..... The fight against these enemies is to be intensified in a political direction. Take reprisals. The working people demand it..... Report to us what you have done in this direction.

Signed: Karotamm

Message of 20 November to the secretaries of the Okrug Committee

Intensify with all means at your disposal the common political task of land reforms and of government deliveries. Performance is still unsatisfactory. Enemy agitation makes the farmers unsure of themselves. In the press, you must be much more decisive.

Signed: Karotamm